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Philosophy is concerned not only ~dth the problem, 
"what is being, tt but it also strives to explain ho"; bei.ng is 
known and the manner in \V'hic'h being exists . Hemce philosophy 
can be characterized (1) as knowledge of being, (2) as knowledge 
of knowledge itself, and (3) as knowledge of existence . Although 
these problems usuall,. make up the constitutive parts of every 
philosophical system in the sense that anyone of them having 
been raised . immediately there arise others. yet considered from 
an historical standpoint , in the course of time, now one, nm1 
another has become the object of special attention . 
The question ttwhat is being" is as old as philosophy 
itself . Originally introduced by the Ancient Gl"'eeks (Parmenides) , 
it has become a central point of interest in every movement 
through the whol e history of knowledge " Also while the question 
of the knowledge of being is an important one in every period of 
inquiry , yet Kant was the first to construct a metaphysics of 
knol'fleEige for the sake of kno\'Jledge (Erkennen dar Erkenntnis) . 
Later the whole of modern philosophy; especially the Hegelian 
rationalistic idealism. adopted and further developed tide 
Kantian heritage . r~nally, the problem of the existence of being 
1 
2 
has found its best expression ill the philosophy of existence or 
existentialism, which is often designated as nthe philosophy of 
our age . n 'l'his is the philosophy ~1e shall consider in our thesis . 
\IJhen we are speaki.ng about exist~ntialism, we are not 
considering something unknown, or something known only by the 
professional philosophers. Existentialism today , although not 
the only i mportant philosophical movement , is the only philosophy 
\\fhich in such a short period of time has acquired the unusual 
stature of an independent , original and thought ... provoking doctrine 
that it even attempts to ente.r into competition with much more 
ancient philosophical traditions, Born in Denmark , l developed in 
Germany and France , this philosophy has broken out the narro1t{ li-
mitations of country and language and achieved an international 
reputation . Existentialism at present is the object of serious 
studies in all parts of the scienti.fi c' world . l\iumerous works and 
articles are being publi shed in many countries and in many differ 
1 It must be noted that general traces of existential-
ism can be f ound in every philosophical system in so far as the 
philosophy treats the problem of existen~ • . In one system this 
existential el ement might . be more emphasized, in other less . 
Some even attempt to consider St . Thomas Aquinas as an existent-
ialist philosopher (Gilson, Maritain) . The author has no inten-
ti.on to offer one or another amn'ler to this questi on , since he 
is merely concerned "nth existentialism in the strict sense: 
systematically expressed philosophical doctrine . 
., 2 
ent languages . 
Besides this academic interest the existential movement 
has also reached the masses of men: it has forced its way into 
almost all fields of life . Art and literature (especially drama, 
e . g ,., as in the plays of Jean- Paul Sartre ) are searching for new 
forms of expression in this direction. Even fashions in dress 
make an effort to follow the tenets of thi s system. 
This tddespread interest might be explained in terms of 
a psychology of' fashion: , everybody wants to be au ~ourant of 
what is r egarded as the "dictates of fashion .. n But besides this, 
there are other more serious reasons l"lhich have caused the popu-
larity of existentialism and which make its appearance on the 
scene not something une,xpeeted or casual . Existentia.lism come,s 
into the world as a protest, as til revolt against the exaggerations 
of abstract reason . The various systems of philosophy of exist-
ence unanimously agree in their opposition to abstract specula-
tive systems of thought , which pretend to explain everything by 
means of imposing logical constructs; to the "objectivisIft,u where 
t he concrete thing , the human existent, has been neglected . In 
common lrlth the American pragmatists, existentialists find them-
selves not satisfied ,'lith the tll'lel1-tailored universe H 'Of Hegel . 
The Hegelian rationalism attempts to establish one's Forld vie,", 
2 See Bibliographx at the end of this work . 
by means of a , process from one clearly definable prJ.nciple . But 
it is not able to answer the most important , vital questions of 
life . It is not the general definitions and rules that are im-
portant for existentialists , but the individual eXistent , as Rene 
Arnoll remarks,3 nthe existentialist is not at all interested in 
beauty in general or in liberty in gemeral ., any more than in 
existence in garlers.l , since all this is nonexi.stent . n The general 
as such is merely a mental construct. ft T!ijtb.a.t really exists, and 
what r eally has any importance, is this individual , the real in-
dividual , wh.ich is my self, n says Gabriel Marcel . 4 
'I'he existential movement bes"ides protesting against the 
general.i21ed theories ·of kno't!11edge as ignoring life, a.lso protest's 
against the social order, which by its ma..ny nisms tl has forced 
man into an impersonal , collective anonymity . Irhe existential 
slogan therefore is: man cannot be reduced to a fJpeu"'agraph in a 
syste.m. n5 The individual sel.fcannot be submerged in the mecha-
nism of society . Therefore existentialism calls :fOT a restora-
tion of the freedom and integrity of the human ,p..e;rson , 'ro the 
3 Hene Arnau, tt};Xistenti·alism in France Today tf tr .. by 
c. 1,. Bonnet ., !.h! l\~odern Scnoolman, St . Louis , XXIX, 1946-47 , 193 . 
4 Cited by Arnoll , ibid . 
5 Soeren Kierkegaard , quoted by J . Wahl , 1:. ShQrJ!, Hi stc-¥. 2.:t;. Existentialism, tr. by TfJilliams and Maron, New York, 1949, 
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objeetive thinker it opposes the subjective thinker. The abstract 
is to be transformed into the concrete. '1'he mere knowledge of a 
truth must be replaced by a.n actual praet icing . '1"he how is mot'e 
important than the ~. 
Yet in their desire to remedy the exaggerations of ra-
tionalism and formal:i.sm existentialists sometimes go even so far 
as to question every kind of demonstration . 'fhey reject every 
form of speculative phi losophy , because all that can be attained 
by reasoning is something general , an object of thought , abst.ract-
ed from the fact that it 1;!. It i s conceivable therefore that in 
spit e of the widespread influence and interest on the one hand , 
€:ltistentialism is regarded by some with a certain reservation 
and even suspicion, on the other . Some of the most important 
reasons for this attitude towards existentialism might be mention-
ed : (1) the ne\1neSS of the philosophy l (2) it s generally hostile 
attitude towards the elder philosophical traditions , (3 ) the or i -
ginality of the terminology used , and (4) the atheistic character 
of the Sartre- Heideggel"ian trend , especially from the standpoint 
of a Christian thinker . 
Yet one cannot ignore this ne'ltl movement of philosophy 
even i n spi te of the fact that he would disagree with t he prin-
cipal tenets proposed by existential:tsln. va cannot classify phi -
losophies into tot.ally "right tl and "falsen ones , as vie can find 
mat hematical truths right and fa.lse . Even in the most challenged 
6 
doctrines ther e can be found a grain of truth , In existentiali sm 
we may f ind a r.aass of truth . In spite .of the occasi onal aberra-
tions and eccentric i ties of this philosophy , we might say in ge ... 
neral t hat existentiali st s are quite right in putting man in the 
centre of all problems . Their effor ts to\'lards recovery of human 
di gnity truly deserve our esteem. Ther efore we cannot f solate 
ourselves from these per ennial problems which the existential 
philosophy brings out in a ne,\,1 light. Not in vain therefore 
Msgr , F:ossino. t he Secretary of the Sacred Congr egation of Semi-
nari es and Universi ties , in his keynote address at the philoso ... 
phical convent i on in Rome , Apri l 8-14, 1947, \'larned: 
Because of its widespread acceptance as an interpretat ion of 
the human situation and man ' s needs in the present time of 
unrest and insecurity , exist~ntialism cannot be ignored by 
a livi.ng tradi tion concerned trlth nova ~ vetere. • •• i t \'lould 
be unfortunate if opposition to atneistic existentialism of 
t he Heidegger-Sartre variety tiera to bli nd us to the genuine 
philosophica.l values t hat are present in existentialism as 
a whole .6 
'rhat studying of existentialism is not a profitless and useless 
"JOrk , but that it is even !1~ge~s@"'y for a Catholic , has been point i'> 
ed out by Pope Pius XII in his Encyclical Humani Ganeri s . Warning 
against the aber rat ions of existentialism and other challenged 
doctrines , His Holiness stated : 
Catholic t heologians and philosopher s , ,<.;hose solemn duty it is 
to defend natural and supernatural truth and instil in the 
6 James Collins , "A Congr~ss on Existentialism, n 
~ Modern Schoolman , XXV, 1947- 48 , 34-35 . 
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hearts of men , cannot afford to i gnore or neglect these 
doctrines more or less devious . Hather they must understand 
them 1tlell , first because diseases are not properly treated 
unless they are correctly diagnosed , then , too , because false 
theories sometimes contain a certain amount of truth, and 
finally because the mind is thereby spurred on t o examine and 
weigh certain philosophical or theological doctrines more 
attentively . 7 
I nspired by these re~sons , the author decided to devote 
some consideration to this modern philosophy . But i t is diff icul 
to speak a.bout exi stentialism in general terms, t o formulate a 
general definition of this philosophy that could be equally 
applied to .§tIl existentialists , since the different philosophers 
who are included in the common denominator, called "existential-
ism, " in fact are quite differ ent from each other , at time s even 
radically so . Besides a great number of common characteristics , 
as their unanimous opposition to abstract speculative doctrines 
and their hi gh evaluation of the human person , there are mar ked 
di ffere nce s among existentialists., which make each of them more 
or less an independent , original philosopher . There is a distinc -
ion to be made between the "Existential Philosophy" (Existential-
philosophie) , the chief representatives of which are Jfartin 
Heidegger and Jean- PaUl Sartre , and the "Philosophy of Existence" 
(Existenzphilosophi,e or Existentielle Philosoph1e) t under the 
lea.dership of Karl Jaspers and Gabriel 1'4arcel . 
7 'rho Enclclical uHumani Generia , U"rith a Commentary 
by A. G. Cotter, (3 . J . , Weston College Press , \Jeston, 1951, '9 . 
These t,tlO groups of existentialists primarily disagree 
in their notion of, and the approach to, existentialism as a 
philosophy . The Heidegger-Sartre variety tries to develop a 
metaphysics, an ontology of existentialism. The problem of 
existence for him is only to serve as an introduction to ontology . 
Stefan Schimanski 8 tells us that Heidegger once confessed to hj.m, 
that hi.s problem "is not man ' s existence , but 'being-in-totality ' 
and ' being as such ' ft II For him "existence" is merely a starting 
point and means for the elabor ation of an ontology _ Heideggerts 
intention i s to inquire anew into the meaning of "Being . " The 
Heidegger- Sartre variety of existentialism "is concerned not "'lith 
actual things , ft as Collins remarks , f!but with the signi f icant 
strueture of existence (Dasein) as capable of ontoloc,ical de ... 
, . 
termination , as leading to a fundamental ontology or discourse 
upon the meaning of being . u9 The nphilosophy of Existence , " 
under the leadership of Jaspers a.nd l\~rcel , in contrast to the 
"Exi stential Ph110sophy , tr has its direct object of investigation 
existence as such. A generali zed theory of being , an ontology 
in the Heideggerian sense means for Jasper s a destruction of 
existence , since neither being nor existence as such can ever be 
8 Kurt F. Reinhardt , The Existentialist Revolt Bruce , 
.Mil'tmukee . 1952 , 132 . - --. . , 
9 James Collins , "An Approaoh to Karl Ja spers , " 
Thought , XX , 1945 , 660 . 
9 
known by a rational investigation. Philosophy can reach only the 
possibilities of existence" which can be realized only by indivi-
dual exist~nts . An analYSis of the concrete condition of being 
means for Jasper's , according to Collins , lO "only a.n intermediate 
step in the movement of philosophizing from a general account of 
real:l.ty to a clarification of the existence of t his individual . n 
These two branches of existentialism also disagree in 
the '\flay in which they solve the problem of the Divine Existence . 
The thei~tic existentialists, among whom, as it is generally 
agreed, the most important ones are Kierkegaa.rd . 1Vlarcel .and 
Jaspers, are convinced that man and his freedom e,ssentially de-
pend on the Divine Existence , that an apostasy f rom Him means a 
complete disintegration of' the human person . 'fhe atheistic exist ... 
entialism,11 chiefly represented by Ni ,etzsohe , Sartre and 
Heideggerj is inclined to replace God by Uebermensch ( Yf supermanft ) 
and to announce., the Itde·ath of God, n as in the case of Nietzsche . 
10 Ibid. 
11 Although V. E. Smith in his critical review of'the 
recent works of James Collins (The Existentialists) and Kurt F,. 
Reinhardt (The Existenti,alist ~tevoltJ holds that ftboth (1 . e _, 
Collins and-rreinhardt) are concerned • • • to ShO'ltl that the god 
denied by existentialism is the god of Hegel or Leibniz but not 
the God of' the Judaeo-Christian tradition" The Thomist, XV, 1952 , 
659 .. ) , yet the author questions this interpretation of Collins 
and Reinhardt. :Men like Nietzsche and Sartre have expressed t heir 
atheistic standpOint too clearly that there could remain anything 
to doubt about • 
10 
For Sartre this passionate desire or man to become God remains 
une passion inutile . 12 Hence comes the feeling of human existent 
-.-. 
as derelict or abandoned (geworfensein) . Therefore man ' s living 
on the earth becomes meaningless , and ends 1'1hen the limit-point, 
"impossibility of all possibilitY, 1t namely death , is reached . 
I n face of' the fac't of these difference S among the re-
pr esentatives of existentialism it seems theref'ore reasonable to 
pick out ~ of them and investi gate his philosophy, sinee other-
\rise , in giving an account of existentialism in general, it would 
be difficult to avoid a sehematism. 'rhe author ! s choice has 
fallen upon ~ Jaspers , \..nth the intention of giving a critical 
analysis of his philosophy under a special aspect, namely , hol" 
he treats the problem of Divine Existence . ~~ile it is true that 
the real value of every philosophy essentially depends on ho\v it 
solves the most important problems of man , is it not true that 
there are no more important problems of man than the problems 
concerned with God 's existence? rfhe idea of God is a central 
idea in every philosophy: whether philosophy \dll stand or fall 
depends on this idea . In this respect Jaspers is quite a unique 
thinker . He stands , it might be said , in the middle betw'een the 
theistic and. atheistic exist entialists . On the one hand , he 
admits the existence of God , yet , on the other, he negates the 
possibility of a contact between God and man . In other words , 
12 Jean- Paul Sartre , L ' etre at k Neant, , 40 . 
11 
Jaspers rejects every form of positive religion, since God f or 
him is a "hidden" God, an Immanent Transcendence . 
For t his reason the author considers the follo'\.d ng plan 
as the best approach for his thesis: the first part is to con-
sider Jaspers t theory of knowledge as such, its partiicular cha-
racteristics, its possibilitie's and limits . The second part 
will attempt to present Jaspers t anS~lers t o the f'ol101.rlng 
questions: (I) whether God can be known , (2) in what manner He 
can be known and l;."rhat i s the extent of our knOll'l1edge of God ' s 
exist ence , a.nd (3) \4/hat is God . In the third part lye will in-
vestigate Jaspers ' position on t he possibility of a positive 
religion. 
-CHAPTER II 
POSSI BILITI ES AND LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE 
The questions, Uwhat 1f/e know" and Ifhow we knm'l" are of 
fundamental import ance in every ' system of philosophy: the con-
cept of knowledge essentially deter mines the direction of the 
Iwhole system. Before taking up any of the philosophical problems 
[treated in a system one must be previously ac quainted 'ltJith the 
theory of knowledge of that system . Hence , bef ore we speak about 
the cognition of God t s existence in Jaspers ' philosophy , vIe \'1ill 
dedicate this chapter to an investigation of the problem of know-
~edge in general. trying to discern i n what this knowledge 
!essentially conststs and what are its pr incipal characteristics . 
~aspers i n hi s basic philosophical works, conSisting mainly of the 
i.,wo monumental publications,l and the four series of leetures , 2 
1 Karl Jaspers , PhilosophischeLogik., Erster Band: 
[.on der Wahrheit, R. Pi per , lV1Uenchen, 1947 . ~ . Karl Jaspers , Philosophie , zweite Auflage; Springer, 
Berlin-Goett:ln ".,en- Heidelber g , 19Z~8 . 
2 Karl Jaspers , Vernunft ~ Existenz , Wolters, 
~roningen-Batavia, 1935 . 
Karl Jaspers , Existenzphi1osophie . 1,;11 . de Gruyter , 
3erlin , 193$ . 
Karl Jaspers, DeI' Phi1osophi .. {3che Glaube . R. Piper , 
"1uenchen, 19J+$ . " 
Km"'l Jaspers , Vernunft und V.Jidervernunf1 i n unserer 
~, R. Pi per , IvIuenchen , 1950 . 
12 
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gives us an unambiguous picture of his philosophical Creed , pro-
viding us with good information on the problems we are concern-
ad with here . 
A. Phenomenological sources .Qf existential Knowledge . 
In the development of his philosophical thought Jaspers has no 
doubt ' been strongly influenced by his fellow- existentialists, 
especially Kierkegaard and Nietzsche , yet the philosopher par 
e]Ccellence for him is Immanuel Kant) Kant T s presupposition 
that das Ding .ru:! sieh, "the thing in itself, , 4 cannot be kno'Wll , 
is of fundament al importance for Jaspers t phi l os:ophy _ Jaspers 
argues that "'Ie are able to know being only as i t appears to us , 
but not as it is in i tself . 5 The reason is that ~,J'e cannot knol" 
being as such neither immediately nor mediately . We cannot knmiT 
being immediately , because our knowledge is essentia.lly an inter-
mediate knowledge . We can knol-"l that \'1hich comes into our con-
sciousness and thus receives its categories . But precisely 
therefore everything that \'(9 know, is only das Sein fuel" ~, 
Tt being for us , H and never das Sein §ill. sich, "being in itself. n 6 
3 Kant for Jaspers i s udel" .Philosoph schlechthint " 
uThe Philosopher, It see Jaspers , pmosophie, i~inleitung , V 1 . 
4 l'he author '!frill use his own translations . 
5 "Rein Gegenstand i st §!!! sieh keiner los~eloest , E.Q!!-
dern, \"'a5 ar als qeKenstand i st . j,st ar i mmer fuel' si n Subjekt , 
~ i hn denft:n; Jaspers , Von del" Wahrneit , 23~ee also ibid _, 
240 . 
6 Jaspers, Del" Philosophische Glaube , 14 . 
14 
lVhat the subject knows is only the object . But no object is 
being in itself, since every object is only a. certain determinate 
.Q.eing . And yet no determinate being is being absolutely . There-
fore Jaspers declares: ttl can never know being ; what I know is 
al~lays !! being . ,,7 In other If!orcis t we kno"T objects and therefore 
\'1e never know being in it self. ' 
Vfe also cannot kno\,1 being as it is in itself through 
the mediation of objects . We should regard the objects as the 
appear ances of being: the object is nothing else but being as 
it reveals inself to us . But the ItrevelationU of being in itself 
through objects is essentially dif:ferent from the "revelati on" 
of any obj ect in the empirical world . This revelation has one 
meaning when we speak about the singular objects of the 1w>lorld , 
for example , "''lfhen we regard color as an expression of certain 
light- undulation; it has another meaning when we regard the world 
as an expression of being in itselr. 8 In the first case we 
7 UNirgends habe ien das Sein , sondern immer nul' ein 
Sein . " , Jaspers , Philosophie , 676'": 
flEeing in itself" or "absolute ing" is in fact no-
thing else but God or "Transcendence,," This confusion of the fi-
nite being with the Infinite Being i s fatal for the whol e philo-
sophy of ,Jaspers . For further elucidation of this problem see 
Chapter III , where the possibility of the knowledge of the Abso-
lute Being is more extensively discussed . 
8 ftTheworld in its total ty is not an object for us . 
All objects are in the world , but Honeai' them is the tv-orld . " , 
Jaspers, Der Philosophische Gl aube, 32; see also Jaspers, Von der 
Uahr heit ,2')6-237 . 
15 
have a simple relation between titlO objects, one of \mich is 
thought by the principle of another . But being in itself in re-
gard to the world is not such a principle as light - undulation is 
the principle of color . rrherefore in the latter case '{IIle cannot 
derive from th '101:' ld being j.n itse lf. nIt is rather. as if being 
\'lould escape from us each time '\V'e attempt to grasp it; as if it 
woul d rema.in in the form of objects, which are only the footprints 
d • n9 an r~ma~ns . To express this tlimpalpabilityn of being by our 
knowledge , Jaspers calls being in itself das Umgreifende, nthe 
all- enveloping .. n Although being embraces all objects" yet itself 
it does not become an object of knmtledge . Everything we kno'(r!~ 
is kno'Wn ill being ; but \'J'e never knmJ' being i t self . Therefore our 
knm'iledge al"'I9.Ys remains horizontally limited . And whenever we 
attempt to break out of the horizont. the horizont itself moves 
alon with us . So we can never arrive at the point from "'rhich 1tle 
could survey being as something in itself a closed totality~10 
In short . Jaspers ' fundamental prinCiple that we are 
able to kPOi'IT the object and never being in itself, means that vIe 
can only knot" emp.irj.cal being , but absolute being , which we call 
God , is inaccessible to our knowledge It ~fuat is then the fate of 
philosophy in thi s case? \~hile the separate sciences have as 
their object of knowledge empirical bej.ng , philosophy as such 
9 Jaspers J .YQu s!£r. Wahrheit , 37 . 
10 Ibid . 37-38 . 
- --- ---------------------
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has absolut bei ng as the object of its knowledge . It seems to 
deny for us the possi bility of knowing being in itself and hence 
means the r ejection of phi losophy as such . 
On the one hand , Jaspers rejects t he traditional notion 
of philosophy , as the science of being , with which properly onto-
logy is concerned . "Ontology must fa.ll, " proclaims Jaspers . l l 
Those who are attempting to gr asp being in itse l f , r emain for him 
nalchemists: If "A.s the alchemists could not succeed i n finding 
t he stone of the wisemen , so al so philosophy ~dll never succeed 
i n i ts efforts to gr asp the SUbstance of being . ,,12 But , on the 
other hand , by condemning traditional phj.losophy as i ncapable of 
knowing being , Jaspers does not re,ject the possibility of philO-
sophy as such . He only thinks t hat he has found a new, original 
method for phi losophizing . Although we can know only that \!'ihich 
can be an object of our knowl edge , he says , yet we can t hink of 
that also \'lhich is not an ob ject of our knm.,ledge . Since we can-
not think of a thing lTithout maki ng it an object f or us, a being 
f or us , therefore "'hen we think of being in itself., we ar e 
compelled to t hi nk of it in terms of t hese f inite objects . 13 
But sinc e we cannot identify the f inite object with infinite 
11 Jaspers, Philosophi~ , 814. 
12 Jas pers, Vo.n del' Vlahrheit , 500 .. 
13 I bid ., 23 1 ; see also Jaspers , Vernunft und Wider-
vernunft in unserer Zeit , 23 . 
17 
being , therefore in order to be able to thi nk of being in itself, 
we must in our thinki.ng let every object "disappear . ,,14 And be-
cause of this "disappearing" of the objects being itself will be 
r eveal ed to us , lrlhi ch now will be no more a certain , definite 
. being , but being in itself or being absolutely speaking . 
This , of course . involves a contradiction: to think of 
an object and at the same time to let it disappear . But l.iTe must 
admit this contradict ion , says Jaspers" if we want to be able to 
think of being in itself . e cannot t hink of being in itself 
in any defi nite category , because it \-'wuld be equally necessary 
to define being in itself through a contrary category . But to 
think of being through contr ary categories means to admit the 
"destruction" (~ Scheitern) of our knowledge . 15 "Yet , ft declares 
Jaspers ,16 "onl y through failure in the search f or being in it-
self do I come to phi l osophize . " Through the forms of our li-
mited knowledge we can reach the infini t e being only by admitting 
the failure of these f orms of thi nking . If, on the one hand , 
by phi losophical specul ation 'tIe are go.:t:ng from f inite objects to 
infinite being , so , on the other hand , it means an irrevocable 
failure: the invincible contradictions i nvolved i n our knowledge 
14 Jaspers , Von der Wahrheit , 40 ; see also ibid . , 257 . 
15 Jaspers , Der Phi losophische Glaube , 21; see also 
Jaspers , Phi10sophie , 705-732; Jasper s , Von der Wahrheit , 20, 67 , 
74 , 232 , 256 , 126, 1030 ff . 
16 Jaspers , Philosophie , 3. , 
prove the impossibility of reaching being in itself by our ordi-
nary knowledge . We cannot regard our philosophical speculation 
as objective knowledge , because the cont~adictions involved there 
destroy every value of that kno\,lledge . It is difficult , complains 
Jaspers . for us to resist the t emptation to regard philosophical 
knowledge as an objective knowledge, because thi s temptation is 
rooted in the very nature of out knowledge: our knowledge natural 
1y tends to separate objects , and strives against such kno\tlledge 
in which these objects should ttdisappear . ff We are shocked l-Then 
'ria leave objects and oonfr ont ttthe infinity of being in itself. " 
Although \'Ie are inclined to r egard philosophical ideas as objecti V( 
ideas , yet if "",e remain in this state, we remain isolated , and 
never will Ttopentt ourselves for being . l7 
If philosophical knowledge in fact is no knowledge , what 
is then its destination? The very meaning of phi losophizing for 
Jaspers consists rather in the process than in t he result ,. This 
explains his paradoxical notion of knowledge . Instead of r eveal-
ing to us absolute being , philosophy only r eveals to us the sym-
bolic phenomena of being . Philosophy has to show us that the 
things we know a.re not being in itself but only the "ci phers" 
(Chiff'er )18 of being . Philosophica l knO\..r1edge cannot transfer us 
17 Jaspers , Von del' \\Tahrheit , 257; see also ibid . , 40, 
108; Jaspers , Del' Philosopiiische Glaube, 21 . 
18 In some of his earlier works Jaspers spells it 
"Chi ffre U .. 
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into an other world , since there is only one world , but it rather 
t1illuminate s lt (erhellt) the objects with a new light, so that 
objects obscure in t hemselves (they remain "obscure ft as long as 
t hey r emain only ff objects H "lith no reference to tfbe ing in itselft!) 
transfor m into the ciphers of absolute bei ng .19 rl'herefore "being 
can be illuminated but never known . ,,20 
What does this "illtuninat ion" consist in? It does not 
enrich us with any new knowledge, it does not add anything to our 
knowledge , but it changes us thoroughly, makes us "new men . " 
If everything which we know is to be considered as a separate ob-
ject , then we 'ourselves, too , \'lould be such an object, the slave 
of determinism of empirical reality . But ~;hen we consider empi-
rical r eality only as the relat ive ciphers revealing to us absolu-
te being , by this ~ free ourselves f rom the slavery of empirical 
r eality; by this we become a"lare -of our freedom . 21 I n this sense 
the illumination of being is also an illumination of ourselves, 
reminding us to be ourselves . Here Jaspers sees the justificat ion 
of hi s philosophy: v"hile the traditional philosophy was concerned 
"nth abstract speculation, his existential philosophy calls man 
19 The nature of ciphers and how they transform into 
the "l anguage II of Transcendence "dll be properly di scussed in 
Chapter III .. 
20 n~ Sein kann wahl erhellt , aber nicht erkannt 
werden . II , Jaspers , Von dar v,Ta.1i'rfieit , 159. 
21 Ibid . , 257; see a.lso Jaspers , Der Phi1osoEhi sche 
Gl aube . 32 . 
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to the freedom of belief; since instead of the pretense of onto-
logy to reach being by knowledge , Jaspers proposes a new method 
of knowing: to search for being through a f ree belief. 
B. "9ompulsive knpwledee" and "fr{;!e belief. It Since the 
proper object of philosophy., being as such, is inaccessible to 
knm,Tledge ., then the only way to come to it is by philosophical 
belief . This belief for Jaspers has a specific meaning . First 
of all, this belief has a moral character: i t means a moral 
conviction, free from every dogmatic content . In order to gain 
a better insi~ht into his philosophical belief, it is necessary 
to point out the distinction which Jaspers makes between the 
truth of "consciousness in general 11 (Be\'ffisstsein ueberhaupt) and 
"existential" truth , or between "compulsory" (2ndngende V1 ahrheit) 
and Urrea" truth . The truth of ttc onsciousness in general" is 
the kind of truth which results fro.m the knowledge of separate 
objects of emp:trical reality . This type of truth i s achieved 
by sense experience and logical evidence ., In both cases we 
arrive at an objective correspondence between our mind and the 
reality . But this correspondence confers upon our knowledge the 
character of compulsiveness (Zwang) , since every judgment based 
on sense experience and logical evidence must be accepted . We 
are forced to ackno'llTledge the certainty of an established fact 
or a logical syllogism . flA.s .Bewusstsein ueberhaupt .•. I ex-
perience t he compulsion of the ' non possibility to be othertJllise ' 
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when I judge of something as true or false. ,,22 his truth is 
equally valid for all . It is atemporal and impersonal, since it 
is not based on our personal conviction but on the objective 
evidence of our knowledge . But practically , says Jaspers , it 
turns out to be the least important for us , since our freedom is 
not engaged in it.. Therefore we regard it most indifferently . 
This comp~llsive knm'lledge enables us to govern natur e , yet it 
does not suffice for us , because it leaves us without any enga.-
gement and purpose !O This sort of kl'lo't'J'ledge is proper to Science 
but not to Philosophy . 'l'herefore Ureal truth ff for Jaspers 
T1begins where the violence of consciousness in general is re-
moved .n23 'l'his is achieved when we replace the compUlsiveness 
of kno\'J1edge by the freedom of belieft the "consciousness in 
general f! by ftexistent U (Existenz) . 24 l1hile by consciousness in 
general Jaspers understands the general principles of logical 
knOl.,rledge which equally specifies everything (since it offers us 
ttobj~cti'Y:e ff and "compulsory" truth resulted from the kno,"lledge 
of separate objects of empiri.cal reality with no personal engage-
ment) , so existent for him is a synonym for man in his unrepeat-
22 "Als tie't'JUsstsei.n ueberhaupt •• , erfahre ieh den 
ZwahB des Nicht-anders-Koennens als dies fuel' richtig oder un-ric tig Ell! erkennen . 'f , Jaspers , Dar Ph'IIoSO'j:?llische Clau~e, 2cL. 
23 Jaspers. Von dar Wahrheit , 607 . 
24 Some commentators of aspers (Re inhardt, Collins) 
translate the German term IlExisteoz" into English as "existence . " 
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able unique ind1 vidua11ty (Selbat). I a.scend into the rank 0.£ 
existent when I become mIself (Selbst). wben all activities 0.£ 
my life become iTeesel.f .... det·ermi.nations . To be existent and to 
be myself are used by Jaspel's as two interchangeable terms . But 
to be myself means to be :free. Therefore to raise the question.: 
am I in the truth of en stance ~ means the same as to ask: is !!I 
life tru1X !!! e?g2ression 5Z! !9I. fre,edom" and not an impersonal 
pX"oeess... In short , t~th for Jaspers consists in my f1delity to 
myself, "in conformity between the realization of myself and the 
l' bl ... -1... -' r' , '1- f ' "25 poss · e e,A.;!"s"ence 0 myse · .. 
Thus. existential truth is not expressed by this or that 
content of knowledge. but only by PlX ,;r~lation .~ that which 1. 
believe . ThIs ianG longer a logical truth, but a moral truth. 
Notwh!t I believe but the mannfat" 1n which I believe is of im ... 
portanoe. Theobjeetive content of beliefohanges according to 
time and persons, yet all existent s must be soli.dar,. in their 
lndispeftsable faithfulness to\1fhat 1s truth for each of them. 
'~le logical truth is valid, universally and necessarily J 
the truth of eXistential belief 1sradieally historical. that is 
to say,. unrepeat.edlypersonal . It cannot be 'ot.herw.ise t since 
existential truth does notcons1st in logical content. but merely 
,.. 
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in a personal conviction, then the belief necessarily is always 
ntY personal truth. 
Yet this radioal historicity 'Of belie.f does not 'mean fof' 
Jaspers a simple relativist.!c subjectivism. Jasper,s here rather 
absolut~~es hi,S be11ef. In SO far as the truth of existential 
belief is unique, historically ' unrepe~table as my personal truth. 
it is the truth in which I believe unconditionally, abs21utelsl_ 
Althougbtheeontentof this bellef'is only ol'lGe true for me, 
yet at .the same time it 1s for me absolutely true.~6 
So Ja.spers distinguishes between the· univ~rsallty and. 
a.bsoluteness ,of truth~ Because or his newly introduced notion of 
"historical absolute.nessn thetrad.1.tlonally eorrela.tl venetions 
of universality and absQluteness for ,Jaspers become problematith 
In place o:f the tradItional notion ot: universal:.ity he puts histo-
ricity which :for him is a synonym for absoluteness" Only logical 
truth is universal" but, it is not ab$o~ute because it is derived 
.from the knowledgeo:f theempirieal reality. Seient1.fic k.nowledge 
can never pretend to absolute tnth. since it cannot gas, a'bso ... 
lute being, Only the exist61ltlal beliet 1$ absolute, Since j.t 
alQne makes us able to "read the cipher-language" of absolute 
beitlg . But again,. this absolutens$s qoncerns not t .he contento! 
belief, but omly the believing existent. 
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On the one hand, th1 s ant1.nomy of the universal c.ompulsi 
~enees of seientifi.e knQ\'11edge and the h1etorical a.bsoluteness 
of beliet eompels Jaspers to relati v1ee all fflogical" knowledge. 
"For the absoluteness of a his'toriea.l truth it is necessary to 
relatiVize every content as hj.stQrleEllly finite .form. 1.127 SOien"", 
title knowledge is relati ~~ b@cause it is not able to ·come to 
absolute being ,and absolute truth.. Relative also 1s philosop.hic-
al knowledge ini·t,s logical expression, although it seekeabso .... 
lute being, yet it fa.il~ to grasp it. S-eience does not reach 
being !n itself, philo·sophy 1.5 not capa.ble of knowledi! Qf that 
being. 
On theothel" hand, by rel:at1.v1zing logical truth,Jasper. 
dogs not negat,e tn$ absoluteness as such Qttruth. He distingu1sj-
es betwe·en th~ notions '01 univel"sality and ab$olu1(eness in ox-del" 
to show the pro-per pla.c$ torabsolutenes5 , namely, the prope,r 
place :9l ~ba.ol~~eness 1! not !A .knl)wledglb;.tt !a J.aif!t not, la 
:!lhipking hut . !!1eJ¢t~:ttn&. Therefore his philosophieal belief is 
absolute not beeaus:e of its content, but because of the uneondi .. 
tioned fai thfulne.s:s of the believing subjeot to himse'lf t i ~ e •• , 
to his own belief. Tbere-tore Jaspers warns against the t empta ... 
tion of wha.t he terms ttcatho!lie1tyU (KatboJ.izitae:t) or "pt"eten ... 
sion to exclusi ve11la ss H ( J\u,$scb11e$slichke;it2~spruch). 28 
27 !1il1d.) 70 ~ 
28 Jaspers. Von del" Wahrhe1t. 833. 
ucatholies tt tel" him are those whoattrlbute to the truth of phi-
losophica.l belief the $,ame eharact,eristics of universal1t.ya.nd 
necessity which is proper only to theseparatescienees, wliicb 
are concerne,d wi:th the knowledge 0,£ empirical being. It 1s il1i .... 
eit and pernicious to universalize bellef, to cQns1de~ it equal~ 
11 valid for all men, becaue00nly paX"tieular sciences can give 
US tr~e knowledge which is therefot'e universal and compul,sory. 
But one who tries to impose hi.s own type' '0£ belief upon others, 
wbo re~a.rds 1 t as an nul timate truth, ,,29 for Jaspers is a phari-
see. Such a universali$atiQnof personal belief would be the 
source of fana,tieism. "All hwna.tl. nobility and greatne$$;n he 
says, "is where personal historicity 1s not absolutized.,n30 In 
other word's. ! should adhere to th~ truth of my personal belief 
with a.bsolute rait·hfulness and at the same time I should avoid 
imposing it upon others. This is a heavy task and yet a noble 
one ", It is heavy., bec.ause ncatholi.eity" tempts one by "offelt'-
i ng object! ve guarantees of salvation. n It oft~'t"s to takeaway 
one ta burden of responsibility to searc,h for and to find the 
truth. It replaces the risk by a tranquillity of attainment,., 
But Ja.spers is tdl11ng rather to withdraw him$el£ from thi.s 
171. 
30 Ibi.d,., 835 . 
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f·catholie tranqu.illit.y: n "We better choose all the pain and not 
this illusory blessing, where tbe truthposs'Qssed is only ima-
ginary; rather vie choose hone,st sincerity with all its e,onse'-
quences rather thansa£e happiness which is only iilusory.,,)l 
Jaspers urges one to be what he is, namely, to be tthim ... 
selfu (Selbst). ffbi s 1s the way of human dignity and honesty~ 
ttl want evel"yoody to be that which I am trying to be l t o he him. 
a·elf in his Oltm. truth. ",32 Ho,",ever. by thls.1aspel'$ does not try 
to ju.sti.fy the attitude of indifference toward.s the t.ruth of 
others. Rather he means that " although I aclOl,owledge that others 
have their tt'Uth.. reet I must. fight. against it, because this truth 
, 33 1 is not mine,,' Thi$ eru,sade of "be ievi'ngexi$tents ft is not the 
fight of truth agains,t, u.nt~tbt it is rather a fight. of' one be-liej 
against anotherbelie.f, a struggle of once absolute truth agai nst 
another absolute truth . ' This struggle of beliefs is character-
ized by ,Jaspers &$ the ul'ltll of infinite eommuni<1at1on .,,34 As 
the belief Wh1,ch pretends. to be exelusively valid is the source 
of' fanatiCism, so the-tree belief which transforms logical knot '1-
ledge ~nt.o historioal" 1s the source o! communioatiQn . 1f;ihoever 
31 Ibid", 462 • 
. 32 Jaspers ) I;hilosQphie, t 668,. 
33 Se$ ,1,b:\,4, •• , 696-69g« 
34 Jaspers, ner PtlilosophisQhe GlauDe" 134. 
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believes that he possesses ultimate truth , ! I!!:t,Ol"j. reject$ tb$ 
existential equality~ which is; the basie prerequisite f¢r '$very 
eormmln1eatiol'1.. One who alt"eady "posses$$s" truth does not need. 
anybody-to On the contrary, one ,·tho knows that the truth of belief 
is absolute <nlly in se .far as it is a principle aeco:r-ding to 
"."bien he J:i.v~J!~ and 'not in $Q far as it is express0d by one Qr 
another logiealeontent; sueh a one remains in the state of a 
continuous search for truth. 
for everjthing and everybody • 
He remains ff()pe:n ~t (auf~eschlo~sef1 ) 
Ther'e tore fot' Jasper'$ free belief 
is belie! in eommunication.: flThe ldeaoieommunieation l.snot 
a utopia. but belief.. It nt$a.n$ foreaeh one of us the questio:n~ 
do we striVe for it" do we beli.eve in 1t- the poss1.bility "'! to 
11 ve together ,to speak togethet"'t to sear'ch tor truth t .ogether 
and in this mann;0r to become each one hims.el.r. n:';' 
All this philosophy of free-belief is 'baaed on the 
di stinet·ion bet~'lflen logical and moral truth: bet\leen t he tr-uth 
of' ffo()nse'i ,ou$n~s$in general n and the truth of' "a'xi sten1;i . n 
\lhil.e the one truth is, eXbauste'd by its knowl.edge, t he other 
appeal$ to lifEh Pure logi'cal truth forces Us to a,e1£~owl:~4&.e j,t, 
'beea'll$e it is bas'ed on facts, but ~xistent:i.al truth requir~s 
¢cm£easl!qn, because it is not bas:edon facts whichl'tould be in ..... 
different in regardt,omatl t but it points out and 'filluminates" 
ma.n's po.ss1bl1it.ies . The truth of' consciousness 1n general 
exists independently from what we are and how \V'e live}' the 
existential truth pretending to point out what we' ought to be 
in order that we could bec'ome ourselves, requires from us un ... 
conditioned faithfulness, faithfulness even to death. No one 
has to die 





logical truth, because no one livesaceord-
be :foolish to die for a demonstrable 
truth, t'I sinee ftthetruth the oertairtty (lr which I can prove does 
not need me tor its, eXistenee,.,n)6 On tbeeo,ntr-arY.,the truth 
which must be reallz·ed in life .is one "With '\..rh1eh I can face 
death itself.",)7 In this sense the. distinction between logica.l 
and existential truth becomes tor Jasp$rs a distinction between 
"the truth w~hich suffers front its revocation and the truth which 
is not affected by tbe revocation,. ff;g 
We have notic'ed t hat Jaspers in his philosophy or exist-
encerai$$s anewth$old problemai' the l"elationbetween fal th 
a.nd reas'on., but hi'S formulation and solution of the pl"oblem:ls 
radically different f rom t,hat of the tl"adltional philo,sopby.39 
36 Ib1d., 11. 
37 Jaspers,!9Jl det Wabrheit, 652. 
:;8 Jasper$,O$r Philosopbisehe G1ilAbe,. 11. 
39 By "traditional philosophyff the author means here 
the Thomistic err Scholast ic philosophy .. 
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While traditional philosophy holds that reason is able to know 
not onlyenxpirieal being? but also absolute beil)g., Jaspers con-
fines re'Elsonmerely to the knowl,edge of 'empiriealreality, leave ... 
ing absolute being to be grasped by faith. Th~ tradItional 
recumn-faith problem Is concerned with the relationhetween 
rational knowledge and revealed knowleclg(lq tor Ja.spers it is a 
relation between the, seientific knowle,dge Ci. e -t knowledge, 
which 1s offered to u.s by separate sciences, for exampl~, astt"o .... 
nomy, biology. mathematios.ete.) and philosophy. wh1,ell tor him 
essentially Cl!>onsists not in knowledge, but in belief. For him 
only tbeseparate sciences give us the 'true knowledge; only 
empirical beingean be known and l'lO"t being in itself. The phi ... 
l()sopner £·or Jaspers cannot knowt he' must belie,va. 
Passing a critioal remark on Jasperst notion ot truth 
we can say that, we must- principally agree with Jaspe.rs on the 
distinction between truths the meaning of which is eXhausted by 
their logical cognition and the truths which receilte their full 
meaning only when, besides being known, they are alse realized 
in life. While our relation to the world ends in knowledge;, our' 
relation to God requires fr'om U$ the engage'mentor our whole 
being . Empirical reality is indifferent to us, but the Absolute 
Reality is the very meaning of our life and not only a simple 
object of :our k.nowledge. In this sense philosophy revealing to 
us Absolute Being reveals at the same time oUJ:'s'elves: i..e" IJ 
our destination. Therefore this kind cf truth re'qu1res a 
comple~E! adoption of the knowing subjeet t not only its logical 
knowledge , but also its realization in lil"~* Even though an 
atheist come to know t.he proofs for the existence of God or be 
an expert in t-heo1 ogy • yet the $ssenee of :religion will remain 
for him hidden. as 1s light for-a blind man. although the latter 
would know the: theory of light. 
Ye.t, on tbeothel" hand;, it se,ems that it 1s not neeessa .... 
ry to contrast so r&d,teally those t wo forms of truth as Jaspers 
does., His truth of the existent remalnsonly a matter of belief 
and not of kno\,Jledge . Tllerefore in fact Jaspers' beli,et i s a1 .... 
way-san nignoran~e," slnee ttbe11e.f is a l"i sk , because the sub-
strate 'Of' true' ~11e,t 1$ a perfe~t ebj~ctive unee'rt.alnty. n40 
A logical rel~tivizat1onor philosophical thinking 1seon$ld0r~d 
as the essential prerequ1s,:tta of true belief': "The philosopher 
remains free in so far a.s his idfi:as are coneerned ••• his think-
i ' r b'" '. a A . , . ..41 ng neve ·e",omes . uogma. ' But not to regard truths of phi ... , 
losoph1eal belief as dogmas means that philosophy is no knowledge 
at all. It might be ~dmitted that ther.e are t.ruths whieh require 
a mor a.l engagement of the knowing $ubjeet., yet thesuPPositi.on 
that these truth. do not give, us any knowledge is 3 .D exaggeration · 
40 Jaspers; ?hilosoph1e t 535~ 
41 Jaspers, Dar Philo$o~hisehe Glal,l~ , 15. 
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To impl, a moral engagement still does nct mean D ipso toexelude 
l Ogical knowledge!t Acceptable is JaspaJ"s t: thesis that the 1:0 .... 
gical a .spectQ£ knowledge does not exhaust philosophical think ... 
ing. but questionable 1$ hls:eISSU$ to another thesis: philos,o-
phical knowledge is no knowledge at all , it 1s only a r~lat1v$ 
expression of free beliet _ Ther'efore CQllins42 1.$ right when 
he SaYSl "Jaspers· denial that there call beS$:J$'iotls ph11os'ophieal 
truth or knowledge reflect.s upon his own philosophical cleclara .... 
tiona.'" 
MOl"eover, this transition 18 also quali:fied as illicit" 
because it does not follow e·o ipso trom the distlnetion made 
bet'{Alee.l1 logical anciedetantial truth~ But since Ja..spers bases 
the distina'cion betl'teen ntbe truth which $l . ffera frem its revo .... 
cation and the truth which is not Q,tfected by the revocation, t)43 
on it, it seems to be necessary t ·o, analyze this distinetion more 
extens "ely in order to grasp its true meaning .. 
Jaspers is right in remarking that the truth of the 
heliocentric system was, not in the least affe·cted ~whenGa111eo, 
Oalilei was foreed to revoke it, because hisrevocatiQn did not 
make the earth. cease to move around the sun.44 But, on the othel' 
i · 
42 JameS Gallina, "An Approa.ch to Karl Jaspers," 
l..hS!ught,. XX, 1945, 66, Ii! 
433ee above , p .. 2$. 
44 Jasper's , Der PhilQsophi sei.te Olaube . 11 ... 12. 
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band). it muet be said that th-Ettn'th o.f Chr1et did not lose its 
\ta.lue fI'om the fact that ·Judas by treason "revoked n i .t. There,,.. 
fore in the case where truth 1.$ revoked (although it is rt:1'H'Pl.1.red 
to be confessed in life), not t ·be trntb It·self ttsa,.ffersft but the 
Il!:rS,2,:q t\rhe revokes it. And jus" as tr'ea.$on of'truth does n(Jtt 
destroy 'tb:$ truth as SUf,:h, $0, c:il,$O faithfulness ,a,s sueh does not 
pr,ove attything: i. e" ~ the en,stenee of a. truth" becau.se truth 
can be s'old out and errol" can be £aithtltllly adhered to .. , Ffhe 
theory of the helioe.en:tric system did llet have to 'be proved. With 
price of the lite of 1,te author:. Likewise GiQrdano Brutlo cou.ld 
not make true his pantheistic mystieia,m by the faetthat he 
proved his faithfulness to it by death. 
But it treason does not af'ieet truth as such and if 
faithfulness eV$"n until death does not prove anything, then what 
sense does the d.16t~:netl(m make betvleen the truth which sufters 
from the revoca.tion andt~e truthwh1chlsnQt affected by treaso. 
TheTe 1$ an essential difference. Although Galileits revQcat ion 
did not afte(tt his personality, neverthelesiS Giordano Bruno could 
not have revoked his philoSQ,hy lrltbout Ii major 'hurt ot his 
personality a .• aphilosophel't; In the f1rs~ C;JMIJ'e there was only 
l"evoea:tion of a simple fact, .. 11'1 the other case the~e ~amE;) into 
eon.sideration a decision: to betray e'onseienceornot~ 
Thero have been l?eople who haveaho:set:1 daatb rather tha.n 
but who were prompted by .id$as which 
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were actually eontrcU"Y and there:tore could not be all equally 
true. Therefore all martyrs" withoutth~ differ ence of' their 
convictions, have in common only the same heroic faithfulness 
to their conscience. That 1 s right. Even one l"thodies for a 
false i dea subjectively i s a martyr of t.ruth, because he dies' 
for t hat which he thinks is' true .. In this sense all uncondition-
ed faithful.ness makes subjeetively just even the one who ~la$ 
objectively unjust. But Jaspers is wrong in saying:!£, men 0 
to die for contrary :tdeas, then the, personaleonvietion as su-eh 
is absolute, while the ideas in tihich they believe are relati. vet 
because they are historically changing. In this sense wh t he 
calls ftexistent1al truth" in fact is not the truth ass-ueh, but 
conviction as such . It is illie1t to raise allconvietions t ,o 
the rank of truth , \<lhel"'e tru~h is no longer contained in logical 
content , hut in moral conVietion, which can be e qually applied 
to diverse logical contents , singe to justify every conViction 
1.8 to d1scriminateagainst truth. It 1s true that men go to 
death for ideas and not for facts" but" on the other hand, they 
die for ideas not because they could not be proved otherwise, 
but because they believe in the absolute eertaint r of these 
ideas"" Thus, only belief in the absoluteness , of truth leads to 
martyrdom,: not a doubt or 
possibility of attainment 
absoluteness of truth :J.t is impossible to ltve 
.. 
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faithf\llneS$. If there were no absolute truth there \'lould be 
nO reason to die for anythi.ng. Instead of justifying all mar-
tyrs of truth every relativization of truth devaluates their 
sacrifice of l ife. Faithfulness to one's conviction tsa moral 
value and therefor~ 1:t is a. 1'Ileasure otm3t', l?ut not Ql,truth .. 
Therefore an elevation of every conviction to theranlc of tru:th 
means an 111ic1ttransition from the moral orael'to ~ logleal 
order !> 
-
Moral justification cannot be made logical justification·. 
Fa.ithfulness to one t S Ol:m conviction justifi.es the one who errs, 
but never the error itself. The faet that one believes some-
t hing to be true still does not mean that it really 1!. true . 
Therefore the beliefs or convietions do no·t create truths, but 
truth judges all beliefs and convictions. Convictions may vary 
like errors, but all convictions are true in so :far as they 
participate in one and the same truth. Faithfulness to one ' s 
subjeet1ve conviction for the sake of faithfulness as such means 
a. blind stUbbornness, not in favor of one f a conscie.nee but in 
favor of error .. 
Summarizing the above we can characteriae Jaspers' trot 
as being anolen and not known . Namely., ""hen the truth of beliet 
(lomes trom free choice, its essence is contained not in the 
content, but in the relation between the believing subject and 
that content. Logical content is only a medium through which 
one expresses his belief. It is something like a changing ltlrap 
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of philosophical belief: it changes ~dth the philosopher . Each 
one expresses himself through a certain content . But every 
content has absolute value in 5.0 far as it is "existentially 
assimilateci.tl as Jaspers says:45 "Philosophical truth is absolut 
in so far as it supplements life, but it is relative in so far 
as it is objectively known and ' logically expressed . " This means 
nothing else but confinement of existential truth in a moral 
righteousness . The consequence .of this is a radical subjecti vi-
zation of knm)"ledge and degradation of truth , in a word , the 
losS of truth . 
45 Jaspers , Von del' vlahrheit , 650 . 
--
CHAPTER III 
EXISTENTI AL COGNITION OF GOD tS EXISTENCE 
Admitting tlie alogical character of our kno"Vlledge of 
being Jaspers denies the possibility of our reason coming to the 
kno"Iledge of Absolute Being , the Transcendence or God (these 
t erms he uses synonymously) . Reason discovers only an "empty 
space u (€linen leeren Raum) which must be supplemented by the 
existent " Only an existent is capable of existential knowledge . 
This knowledge consists in the illumination of the existent , 
namely , 'V'Ihen admitting the failure (Scheitern) of our knm'lledge 
to know being in itself or Absolute Being and so becoming aware 
of his freedom the existent approaches to God by a free self-
determination (J<:ntschlu5S): i " e., in a moral 1/,lay . So in this 
chapter we will discuss Jaspers ' reasons why God cannot be knO\ffi 
by ft logical kno'Vrledge!t (i. e . , our ordinary kuowledge) , and vlhat 
is the existential cognition of God 's existence. 
A. Symbolic signification Qf Jaspers' proofs for the exist-
~ .2f God . The task of Jaspers' phi losophy is to sholtl that 
"Transcendence is not to be reached by knowledge . "l Transcend-





ence is f or us in so :far as \'1e are existents the Unthinkable 
( 4.~!. Undenkbare), Ilthe invisible and never empirically demons-
2 
trable Other . !? His efforts to keep the Deity i'ar from our kno\'l-
l edge call f"orth a logical analysis of hi s att empts to demonst rate 
why the Absolute Being cannot be known . Vie cannot knm'l God 
thr ough the f orms of our limited knowledge , since through these 
forms we can know only t he separate objects and not being as such . 
Therefore any category by which rwe try to define Transcendence 
turns out to be an inadequate one and r equires to be supplemented 
by a contrary category . Oux efforts to gr a sp Tr anscendence by 
reasoning can be eharacterized as a Ucontinuous tumbling t owards 
an i mposs ibility !II n3 
We cannot think of God as a being without being at the 
same time compelled to thi nk of Him as a non-being . In the one 
sense non- being means non-existence of something; in another 
sense non- being signifies everything that is not determined 
(das Nichtsein jed~s bestimmten Etwas). In this latter sense 
non-being i s the verx being , since Absolute Being (or l1being in 
itself" (das Sai n !!!! sich) or "being as such tf (da s Sain schlecht -
hin)} is no determined being . Thus , Transcendence is being and 
2 nDas unanschauliche ~ nie empirS.s eh nachweisbare 
A.ndere . 't , Jaspers , Von dar Wahrneit , IO'7. . 
3 nEs ist ein immer !1! erneuerndes Sichueberschlag~n ~s Denkens zum NIC'htdenkenkoennen . Ti , Jaspers , Philosophie, 708; 
see also i bi d ., 705- 732 . 
non-being at the $atne time . Only by this paradoxical formula, 
where "being and non-being become identical can we think of 
TranscEmdence , ff says Jaspers . 4-
In a like manner Jaspers tries to convince us of the 
impossibility of defining Transcendence by any other category: 
\"lS cannot think of Absolute ' €ling as a unieity without being at 
the same t:l.me compelled to adrnit the duality , nor as a form ".nth ... 
out matter , nor necessity without contingency_ Rather , accord-
ing to Jaspers , we must consider Transcendence as a unicity and 
duality , form and matter , necessity a.nd contingency , universaltty 
and individuality , eternity and temporality . But this is impos-
sible to think . Therefore a oategorical thinking cannot reveal 
to US Absolute Being . 5 
Jaspers conceives another sor t of categories , t1hich he 
calls the trcate ories of freedom,u such as reason {V'ernunft) , 
spirit (Geist) , freedom O'reiheit) , and eri.stence (Existenz) . 
But by these categories , too 1 it is impossible to reaeh Trans-
cendenee , because it would mean a degradation of 'franscendence 
to the level of human finitude . 6 We have no right to absolutize 
4 Jaspers , Von der ~lahrhe1t , 260 . 
5 Jaspers PhilosoEhie 705~72g ; see also Jaspers, Yon del" INahrheit , 20 , 2i16-JOl, 090 , 1030 . 
6 Jaspers , Philosophie, 728-732 . 
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our reason , "to make it Logos , Creator. ,,7 Neither have \'19 any 
right to imagine God as a pure spirit: although it is a more 
noble picture of our imagina.tion, yet it l.oJ'ould degrade Him . \')e 
are not even supposed to absolutize t he existent himself: bei ng 
free an existent is basically a possible existent (moegliche 
E:Jcistenz) , or Us. being which does not exist J but .... lhich might and 
::::.=--- ' 
. . t ,,8 
must ens . • But Transcendence is an absolute being whi ch 
"wipes off every possibility . tt We cannot identify Tra..1'1scendence 
\-11th the existent , because the existent is conscious that he 
stands before Transcendence and therefore he feels that he is not 
Transcendence: ltlvhere I properly am myself I know that I have 
been given to myself (class fch mil" geschenkt \-Terde) py Transcend-
ence, the pO"ler through ~(hi ch I exist . 119 Theref ore all our effor s 
to r each rrranscendence by the categories of our knot.;rledge are 
condemned to an inevitable failure . "There is no direct kno't'11edg 
10 of God . " We may ascribe to Divinity thousands of names , but no 
name is adequate . Each time 1':e begin to think of God " He 
"escapes" from us . I f .... '9 l1fould be able to know God by the f'orms 
7 Jaspers., Der philosophische Glaube" 27; see also 
Jaspers , Philosophie , ~9 ... Pl~(j . 
8 Jaspers , ~ Philosophisehe Glaube, 18 . 
9 Jaspers , Von del" Pahrheit . 110; see also Jaspers ~ 
Existenzphilosophie, bb7 --- . . , • 
10 Jaspers, Del' Philosophische Glaube , 33. 
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of our kno't'lledge , God "lOuld cease to be God, because "demonstratec 
God i s no more God . ttll 
Yet the admission of the failure of our kno"Vlledge to 
grasp God is not entirely senseless: although we cannot ar ise to 
the knowledge of divinity by our reason , yet our reason turns us 
totl'lards Absolute Bei ng by the very experience which we arrive at : 
flIt is possible that there can exist ,something vv-hich it i s i mpos-
sible to know . ,,12 If '''e cannot know what 'rr anscendence is , yet 
V.fe know that Transcendence exists . l3 
We cannot come to kno"tl Tr anscendence , ecause Tr anscend-
ence does not speak direct l y to us, but only through ciphers . 
Everything t hat exists proclaims Transcendence , s i nce everything 
ean be considered as ciphers of Tr anscendence . Every object is a 
cipher in so far a.s it is s omething more than \'llhat \<16 are able t o 
know of it . We transform the ndeaf and dumb objects" into a 
symbolic language of ciphers when we relativize the objects to 
phenomena , 1-"hen we cease to consider them as noumena . 14 
11 "E.in bewiesener GoU ist ~ Gott . f! t Jasper s , 
Q.fg: Phi lQ..sophi SCIie Glau be t 30 . 
12 "~ ist denkba1" t dass ~ gibt , :,J'as nicht de nk bar, 
~. IT . Jaspers, phiIosopnie, 7~ 
13 
14 
Jaspers . Von del' Wahr heit , 1031 . 
I bid . 
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~~'hat is the relation betvlTeen objects and ciphers? gvery 
object can be transformed into a cipher of Transcendence , since 
"everything that exists in the world is a symbol . n15 Although 
all objects can be changed into ciphers of Transcendence , never-
theless t he ciphers themselves do not constitute any !.ill!! vvorld , 
as existin apart from the world of Ob jects . l 6 Object~ ~nd 
£1..Hhers are rather. t \'19 dimensions .Qf the .~,~ ~ same world: 
when we consider the vlOrld as a flbrutal reality , IT "'Ie see it 
constituted by objects ., but when \'1e consider the world as a 
symbolic language of Transcendence, we see the objects as ciphers 
of rrranscendence * "Ciphers are not new objects J but objects 
filled with something new. nl7 In this sense Jaspers compares 
the relation existing bet een objects and ciphers with a relation 
existing between a. herbarium and fresh plants , or a collection of 
bones and a living organism . le 
What kind .of relation exists between Ciphers and Trans-
cendence? C5.phers are not Tra.nscendence itself, but .only its 
"language 4" Tr anscendence speaks to us t hrough ciphers, itself 
15 Ibid. 
16 rtThe world c'eases to be ''1orld when it is trans f ormed 
into the l anguage of Transcendence . n , ibid ., 634 . 
17 ttChiffer.si~d kefne neue . Gegenstaende , sondern neu 
er.fuellte Gegenstaende . , iEla .,]15'43 . 
18 Ibid ., 1036 . 
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beooming no cipher; '9 HGod is not a cipher, but the very reality . n ... 
Ciphers are only symbols , 'l'rans cendence i s the absolute being . 
Ci phers are only a medlum betiveen Transcendence and us: a s the 
kno\'dedge in the case of consciousness in general is a mediator 
between the subject and the obj~ct, so the ciphers mediate 
T d ,1 ' t · t 20 between . ransc e n ene€: an ('1 eX1S en '" And yet although the 
ciphers ar e not Transcendence itself, on the one hand , Tr anscend-
ence is not beyon~ ~ ci'ehers , on the other. vIe cannot through 
ciphers get into any nothern world: tl Being in itself i s not an 
other reality hiding itself behind the reality we knolt-J .,,21 
Jaspers makes a distinction between Ciphers and symbols 
or s i gns ( Sym\>91~ O$ter Zeich.€q,;d . 22 w'hile mere symbols signify 
t hings eXisting independently of them, in the case of ciphers it 
i s i mpossible to distinguish between the Cipher and the thing 
symbolized by it . The Absolute Being , signified by Ciphers , 
inhere.,s ~.mmediatelY lu its sxmbol . And if we cannot i dentify 
Tr anscendence with any of its Ciphers ) it is not because Trans-
cendence l'loul d be hidden behind the Ciphers , but because every 
19 Ibid ., 1051. 
20 Jaspers , Phi1os ophie , 68$- 689 . 
21 Jaspers , Von.s!£!: Wahrheit , 1032 . 
22 Ibi d ., 257 . 
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cipher remains only a s ingle aspec"ll of Tr anscendence . 23 
This reasoning leads Jaspers to a conclusion that we 
must admit an "immanent Tr anscendence" (die ,!mmanente Tra,.nszenden, ) . 
An "abstract monotheism" which admit s an nothern 1tlorld is only a 
"nega.tive i dea" which degrades this wor l d . 24 Instead of distin-
guishing between Transcendence and the world , '.tIe must in. ~ 
world itself seek :for Tr anscendence : liThe world is the place 
-- , . --",, ~
where Transcendence speaks to us . ,, 25 
I t seems that a.dmi tting t he ff immanent Transcendence" 
Jaspers comes dart..gerously close to the pantheistic notion of God . 
But soon it becomes clear that this suspicion, in so far as 
Jaspers is concerned , i s an unfounded one . He argues that an 
alternative such as t he ism or pantheism is possible only in the 
order of logical kno~T1edge or knovJ1edge of consciousness in ge -
neral , '\-There God and the world are thought .Qf E!§. II they ,..Iere op 
the ~ level, as i f they were objects of the SBa-ne kind .. By 
think:i.ng s o, says Jaspers , either the vlOrld means everything , and 
so the 1rforld becomes God , or it means that there exists God and 
the world, and in this manner God is but an nother n world . 26 
23 Ibid . , 108 . 
24 Ibid . , 1050- 1051 . 
25 Ibid . t 108 . 
26 Ibid ., 90 ; see also i!&£., 107: "That , in which an 
through \'I}hich ' are we there t (~:;;.? sind) >> i s the '.<forld . That , 
I 
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But such a ttdouble ... ingtf Jaspers calls a naive materialization of 
Transcendence , where the thing s belonging to this world are 
transferred to the "beyond , ft and ",here they are enlarged and mi-
nimized accordi ng to one f s n ad . 27 Existent finds Transcendence 
in unity ",dth the 1}lorld and not beyond the ,,,orld . There exists 
neither Hc1 j ,e blo~se 'ltlelttt (the ftbare " ltlorld , the worl d only) nor 
"ili reine Transzendenz l1 (the pure Transcendence , Transcendence 
28 only:) . The s impl e identifi cation of the world and Transcend ... 
ence as 't'lell as their radical distinction i s to be rejectpd, says 
Jaspers , since by adm5_tting pure immanence or pure transcendence 
we degrade the ''forld . Only when the .. ,orld is changed into a 
language of ciphers its true va lue can be saved . 'lPmen 1,.,;e 
distingu:i.sh 'the ltlOrld f r om Transcendence, we are no longer able 
to evaluate the world l>dthout illusions , since the brutal reality 
of the l'lorld as such cannot satisfy us . 29 
Only the existent is capable of reading the ciphers; 
only he .i s c pable of transforming the Hbrutal" objects into 
transparent symbols, because tlTral'lscendence reveals itself only 
in ltlhich and t .hrough which hive aT'a we-ourselves t (wir sind Selbst) 
~- .....  - . ;;;;;.;;..,;;;...;;,. 
and free , is the Transcendence. u 
27 Jaspers , PhiI050~hi~ " 684-6g5 ; see also Jaspers , 
Von de~ irlahr-heU, ~9 , 107 . 70. 
2$ Jasper,s, Von der v-lahrheit , 980 . 
29 Ib~d ., 107. 
\ 
., 45 
. ~...: t· ·t · n30 for 19 .. '1...1.. s · en . I n other words , a s long as I remain outside of 
the rank o£existent , I can see only the world a.nd nothing mor e . 
Just as in sense knowledge the organ fmlst s omeho\'iJ' get in touch 
"lith the object in order to knm'IT 1:1; , so man must become existent 
or tthilllsel:f" i f he ,..ratlte to get in touch with Tr anscendence " And 
if, on t he one hand , I can understand the language of ciphers in 
SO far as I bec ome myself, on the other hand .. I become myself in 
so far as I expose myself to the speech of ciphers . I am an 
existent in so fa.r as I turn myself to Tra.nscendence (by tlreading 
its cipher s ff ) , and vi,es vga.a.: I am able to turn mysel.f towards 
Tr anscendence in so far as lam an existent . 
l~Jha.t does the reading of ciphers consist in? F'irst of 
all , reading of Ciphers does not mean any kno\'d .edge of being , 
since "it would be fal se to regard symbolism as knowledge . fl 31 
{ather readi ng of Ciphers means producing of new ciphers: HThe 
!philosopher reads the ciphers of being by creating ciphers of 
nind . nJ2 Philosophica.l kno\,llecige is not an objective kno\'!lledge: 
philosophical concepts are only the symbols of Ciphers . '1"0 make 
philos ophi c.al idea s knowledge means to degrade knowledg e itself. 
~f \'lTa arr ive at the knowledge of' Transcendence t hrough Ci phers , we 
30 Ibid ., 110 . 
31 Ibid .. t 103$ . 
32 Ibid . 
-
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arrive at the knowledge of Being !.! inaccessible !2. our logical. 
Knowle~dE.,e . 'fhere fore Transcendence reveals itself to us as at 
hidde n God . flGod iJ? (i ~ e., exists) , but Whom \t{e neither see 
nor knm,q. oJ> 'l'hus , the philosophical reading of ciphers is 
neither true , n,qr fa;tse , because it is no knowle dge at all in the 
strict sense or the tio:rd . For this reason the reading of Ciphers 
cannot be subject to a logical criterion, but only to the exist-
entia:). cl. ... iterion: does this or any other philosophy strengthen 
t he existent ? I f the answer is positive , thana pbilosophyis 
true , and vic~ versa . In other words , it means: does t he 
existent recognize in it, his Transeendenoeor not 734-
Since philosopbical reading oi:c:J.phers is not a logical 
kno"l11edge of' Absolute Being, it therefore cannot pretend to a 
universal validity , Each existent reads the ciphers only for 
hi mself. "An object is a sign of' the Other , 'tJ'hieh is not strange 
to me , but i s t hat through which r am properly mysel! or lean 
be properly myself . n3 5 The\\fay leading to God is not a \-ray of 
objectbra certainty; it ianot a way of certain and universally 
valid proofs of' God' 8 existence , since "after Kant all ontology 
33 Jaspers , Vernunf'~ und Exi$t~nz " 30 ; see also Ja s pers , 
J aq del" ~\[ahrheit , 1049 : t'!3ut t he one God i s di s tant, the entire -
ly otner . absolutely hidde:th It . 
34 JaspersJ V,on der ~{ahrhe1t , 110 . 
35 I bid ., 257 . 
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stands condemned. n36 We ean :reach God onl y by existential belief, 
itlhich is historically personal and the characteristic mark of 
which is its objective uncert.ainty .• 
B. SearcF for Q.2!! ,through !. revolt aga;nst~ . Since God 
cannot be known by logical knOYlledge but only by a philosophical 
belief, then the whole philosophy of Ja~pers is marked witb a.n 
invincible tension (S:eannung) between certainty and uncertainty , 
between a defiant revolt ('l'ro~.~) and a trusting self ... resignation 
37 (Hi!?:g,a.beL., Namely, I "open" myself to the cipher-language of 
Tr anscendence \~hen I become royse'lf' , and further, I oocome myself 
when I enter the limit-situations (Crenzsi tu.ationea) such as 
death , pain, fight and guilt , 't-'fhere I experience a radical con-
tingenoy of the reality . "''1hieh is surrounding me)8 Entering 
these limit-situat.ions I am shocked . Thoughts come to my mind: 
"Ihy t he world and eV'erything t hat exists is rather imperfect, 
deficient and contingent i nstead of being perfect and absolute; 
l'fhy instead of truth and good there is so l'lruah untruth and evi 1 
in our 11£e?39 Is this life where evil, pain and death prevail 
36 Jaspers, !!xistenz;;ehilosophie , 17 . 
37 Jaspers ,. Philos.oEhle~ 736 . 
38 5Situations become l~m1t-situations "" hen they awaken 
the existent in man t hrough a radical shock of his whole being . n (italica of the author of the thesis), 'J'as'pers , Phi+os.$'Ehie , [,,9 . 
39 tfhis peSSi mistic element of Schopenhauer is a note 
common to all existential:tsts . 
worth living at all? I refuse to consider the li£e I live ~ 
mine, because it "-18.8 give n to me without me . 40 Having once 
experienced this I no longer can live peacefully. Therefor e my 
entering into limit-situations t urns out into a revolt against 
that \-.,hieh i s going on in the world . I r aise a voice of protest 
agaihst disor der of the ,,,,orld and life . But , on the ot her hand . 
whil e protesting against life I at the same time feel longing 
for life : a longing to come back to that against which I have 
, 11 d 41 reoee • 
.rut that i s not a logic'al conviction, not a. logical 
reasoning which can reconcile me with the life . The only \\Yay to 
overcome my revolt against the Ground of being is the 1tlay of seli l'-
r esi gnation , which means , I should take life as it is . I find 
my \'1ay back to Tl"anscendence when I change my hateful disposition 
to life into a conviction t hat this life has been given to me 
and I am r eady to acoept it . 42 
This reSignation of mysel f is based on no tttheodicy" 
'I'lhich looks f or arguments to explain and justi£y t he evil . 43 
Evil ha.s a real existence , theref ore any effort to deny it would 
be vain . An nexplanationft and Ujust i f icationtl of evil on the 
40 Jaspers , Philosophi e . 736 . 
l4-1 Jaspers ., .Y:.Qn del" llahrheit , 718- 719 . 
42 Jaspers , Philosophie , 740 . 
43 Ibid·. 
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basis of its neces,sity for "universal harmonyn or uordern 'vould 
mean to come back to the same illusions from which man once 
escaped by his revolt against the order of life and t he \'J'Orld . 
There is no scientific explanation . since nealf-resignation 
renounces knowledge . n44 Rather the reason for ,such resignation 
is a 'complete ignorance, HO\rlever , this does not mean a radical 
negation of that \-{hieh it is Rossible to know, but it ratber 
means that we should give up any pretense to know that TJ'rhich is 
accessible only for belief and not for kno,"lledge . In this sens,e 
self-resignation is nan active confidence , which in i gnorance 
turns us to''1ards Transcendence . u45 
Since self- resignation cannot be based on kno\'J'ledge , \-'fe 
remain ina continuous tension bet,,{een . self-resignation and 
revol t . The possibility t o raise a voice of protest ane't'f can 
never be put aside once and for all , since in the ""orld there 
is ahmys happening something "\-'Ihich cannot be justif ied accord ... 
ing to our standa.rds of right and wrong . Therefore our attitude 
t01flards life should be a continuous winning the self ... resignation 
in face of the reality l;1'hich always stimulates us to revolt . 
UReal self ... resignation J5 possible only through a surmounted 
revolt . n46 A complete overcoming of the tension between revolt 
44 Ibid ., 742. 
1,,5 Ibid . 
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and self-re signat;ion 'liroul d be possible only by an evident inter-
vention of trranscendence itsel£', but if God would reveal Hi mself 
t o us in a visible waY , then ne ither revolt , nor self-resignation 
would be any IO!l..ger possi ble , s i nce there \Ifould remain for us 
only one possibility: a blind obedienee . 47 By r emaining hidden 
Tr anscendence 5hol-IS u s t hat i t ltrants nno blind obedience , but 
. ,4$ freedom , \'lhere a revolt is al't",ays POSS1 bie 11 1 Existential free-
domis that 'l.'1i1ichstimulates the seareh for Transcendence . Thus , 
the revolt as S1,lch against Transcendence i s rather a negatiVe 
communication with Transcendence: HRevolt against God is already 
h f G d ,,49 a. seare or 0 ~ 
The tension betW'eenselt-resignation and revolt original 
ly is a tension betll/een freedom and Being, bet·l-leen existent and 
'l'ranscendence . Every attempt to surmount this tension either 
leads u s out of the world , or it cause s us to sink into brutal 
reality . If we absolutize the revolt and cheCk out our longing 
for self-resignation l"le have a Promethean eXistent , having con ... 
fidence only in himself. There is free dom \'lithout Transcendence . 
I f , on the other hand , "" e absolutize self-resignatj.on and remove 
47 
48 
Ibi d . _  
49 "Hadern mit Gett 1st €lin SuCh9l'! Gottes . n f. Jaspers ,. 
!:h.ilosophie . 743 . . ---- - - - • 
--
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the possibility of a revolt t-l€ have Job ' s ascetic existent , tmo 
has lost his freedom in t he pr esence of Transcendence . Here \'le 
he.ve Tra.nscendence \'Jithout freedom. 50 I n althar case we would 
destroy ourselves as existents . 
I f' 'If.le can absolutize neither the revolt nor self-resign 
tion, we cannot re·lea.s e the tension betlrleen theIr! , for in one 
case we wou l d become victims of nihilism, and in the other case 
"fe woul d l ose ourselves i n t hat passive slavishness . '\'IThere one 
i 1 f 11 h " k t· h' .' d 1 51 Th ~ . .( t t' p ous y a s on ~ s _ nees 0 vvors :L.p ~ 0 s .. · e eJU..s en loS 
saved in so far as this tension i s maintained . A constant pos-
sibility to revolt against 'Tr anscendence assures for the existent 
his freedom, and a self- resignation leads the existent to Trans -
cendence . Irherefore the true vocation of every existent is to 
rew.ain freE2. i]l the Eresence of Transcendence ~ ffThe more I a.'fIl 
orientated to'1lV'ards God, the more I am myself , and the more I am 
myself' ~ the mor e I a.m orientat ed tOl'lards God .n 52 
In short , '111)'e cannot arrive at God , because He remains 
absol ut e l y hi dden . But by t his very failure of our knowledge \»16 
ascertain our freedom. By remaining hidden God presents us \'Tith 
50 Jasper s , Philosophie , ?37-73 ~ . 
51 IbiS_, 443-.444 ; see also ibid . , g19 . 
52 n~ m~hr, Vor stellung von Gott , !:,ll!! .§.Q mehr .§~elb$t; Mt ~ehr Se l bst ,. urn SO meht V'orstel !ung: von Gett . " , Jas pers , Von del' 
wanrhe:i. t , 543 . 
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freedom "'Thich we have to appreciate , but not lose :for the sake 
of any idol, as Jaspers warns : 
I~lfan should not fallon his knees before any sort of i dol: 
either of his O\<l"!l personality" or tha.t of' lnankind , or God 
as a person ~ Against all possible idols and against Trans-
cendence r evealing itself man must fight , defending his 
right, ' '''hieh he has received i'rQnl the distant Transcendence: 
God wants that I remain mys~lf . ~3 
c. Guilt , rut tpe waI ~ ~scgndence . 'l'he ul1knO\\fability 
of Transcendence is for Jaspers the very condition of our freedom. 
Therefore a question arises: what sort of freedom is this, which 
forces him to guarantee it by an absolute hiddennes,g of Trans-
cendence? , The consciousness of freedom for Jaspers is essential-
ly connected \\i'ith the consciousness of guilt " 'dhen he says that 
we are able to come to the hidden 'rranscendence only ttlTough 
f reedom, he means that the consciousness .Qf our culp~bilityis 
t he ye:r:v: proof of the eJeistenc.€ Q.;f God . Our feeling of culpa-
bility points out for us the fundamental truth: U'f'hen I am truly 
myself , then I am no longer myself a.lone . n54 If we \'i/'ould be 
just alone , by ourselves , l'fe would never feel guilty or respons.." 
i ble to anybody . But since 'Vie actually do feel guilty , then 
there mus't exist somebocy else besides us to whom \'\[e feel 
responsible . ttlI' there would exist no Transcendence, I vlOuld 
53 Ja.spers " Ph=!.1oso:ghi e¥1 g19 . 
54 Jaspers, Von de;r Wa.hrhei~ , 633; see also ibid . , 108 . 
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alit1ay s ask myself' why I desire something at all, or I would do 
everything i>'nthout any feeling of guilt .. n55 
Our feeling of culpability holds us back from absolu~· 
tizing our freedom . If' , on the one hand , '\I'le are free , on the 
other hand , vie a.lli'!ays are conscious as ft being giv6n ft (geschenkt -
geworden) to ourselves o56 :F'reedom i s not absolute . Otherwise 
it ltmul d be ttemptytl i f it was not confronted w:1th anytl ing . 
Instead of that , freedom rather i mplies a longing to be surmount-
ed (aufgehoben) . But it can be surmounted only by Tretnscendence , 
. t:.7 lt/hich has given to us our existence and our freedom • ./ 
VIe have seen that our consciousness of guilt f or Jaspers 
is the chief- witness :that we do not ex:l.st alone in t hls <'{orId , 
but that we stay in the presence 01' Transcendence " But since 
guilt means aversion f r om God , by de1'ini freedom as guilt 
Ja.s pers ultimately defines freedom as .freedom against God . 
I n short , Jasperst search for the Absolute Being rtight 
be sumrnarized in this manner: if there ~lOuld exist no Transcend ... 
ence , there \'lould be possible OUI' arbitrary action , f'or I.'Thich tve 
'i'lOuld feel no re sponsibility or guilt . But since we actually do 
55 tJaspel"s , Philosophie, 73 S,4! 
56 Ja.spers , VOA d,?r.. \lJ'ahrheit . 110 . 
5? Jaspers , D,e:f. Philos~phisch~ Glaube, 53 . 
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feel responsible for our activities , than t here must exist God 
to Whom vie are responsible . lJloreover; if God \~lould be knowable 
in the strict senee, ''fa automa.tically would be compelled to 
obey Him, and. as a result of that , -vre would lose our freedom" 
But with the loss o,f freedom there would disappear automatically 
the responsibility for our activities . 'l'herefore God must 
remain hidden . 
CHAPTER IV 
EXI STENTI AL ATTITUDE TOWAliDS POSITIVE RELIGION 
Characterizing his philosophy of existence as a free 
belief, Jaspers separates phil'osophy from sciences . Philosophy 
is not sCience , because it does not give us any kn.owledge in 
the strict sense of the word . We can arrive at kncx\Tledge of the 
objects of empirical reality through separate sciences , but hei 
as such , \·lhich i s the object of philosophical knowledge , cannot 
be knoirffi by rational investigation, for it can be reached only 
through belief. 
At first sight it may look as though Jaspers ' phi losoph 
should come nearer to religio~ than any other philosophy , since 
it i s principally ba.sed on belief', whicb is a characteristic mar 
of every religion . Yet it is not so ,. Jaspers separates philo-
sophy f rom religion as well as from sciences . Since his philo-
sophy is a t'ree belief, it stands in an inimical relation with 
religion, vlhich is based on .authority. Philosophy is a belief, 
but it is not an authoritative belief. Being essentially a free 
belief Jaspers t philosophy is incompatible with any authority . 
tt All free k nm<ll edge rises against authority, tI because nit 
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attempts to prescribe t he content of knowledge f or us . n1 
Although he admits a. tension existing betv1een philosophical belie ~ 
and scientific kno\i'ledge ~ yet t his tension is only a relative 
one : if philosophy is not science , yet it presupposes scientific 
knO\.;ledge in so far as it is c'oncerned "nth empiricalreallty . 
Therefore there iano absolute hostility between philosophy and 
science . I t is othermse in the ease of religion . To be a phi-
losopher and at the same time to be a confessor of a rel:tgion 
f or , Jaspers are t,,,o a.lternati ves radically and absolutely . incom-
patible with each other . ti 1i~or the philosopl,ler as sueh faith is 
possible. but not r el=!-gion <\H2 It is necessary for a philosopher 
to fi~ht against reli.gion: tf Philosophy may contract Ii friendship 
wit h science, but it must fight against religion . ,,3 'rhis hostile 
attitude tot-farde religion flows fl"o·m his conviction that philo ... 
sophy ,.;ould lose its .freedom by subn'litting :i.tself to the authori-
ty of Revelation . Perhaps , Jaspers admits , if the usupposedu 
Hevela.tion was !:,ea:);ly t'the word . of God , ft t hen it would be i mpos-
sible to i gnore it. fill' we had to' ehoos.e betw~en God and man, 
it "lOuld be impossible not to ehoos'e God . ,,4 The same idea he 
1 Jaspers , Von der vla~:rheit, 81.3; see als01.bid .j 808 ! 
"Therefore it is necessary to r::Lgnt continuously against aut hori-
ty . tt 
2 Jaspers, fhi .. l .osophie, 252 • 
.3 Ibid ., 25L. 
4 I ,bid .. 271 . 
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expresses in a somewhat sophistical manner: if God really had 
revealed Hi mse·lf to us , then even the greatest absurdity itself 
could not be considered as an objection against this Revelation: 
. If' that (1 . e., Revelation) were an accomplished fact, Reve-
lation would be a fundamental and ultimate truth, which 
could not be surpassed by any other truth, and where every 
question concerning its possibility, actuality or contra-
dictoriness \'lIQuId be frail . The Revelation would be the 
beginning of all our search for truth . Our every truth 
then should be submitted to Revelation and not Revelation j udged by our previous knowledge of' truth .5 
This is a sophistical reasolling ; since Jaspers admitting that 
even an absurdity would not be an objection against Revelat ion 
if the Revelation were an accomplished fact , rejects the possibi -
lity of a Revelation by rejecting every historical \"Iitness o 
Immediately he raises the question: how can \119 know t hat Reve-
lation is truly lithe '\t/ord of God7 TT We must rely here on witnes-
ses , answers he himself. Yet "the wor d of man is not t he word 
of God . ,,6 I n so far as Revelation is transmitted, it receives 
5 "VIenn das geschehen waera , 9ann "laeTS die Wirklich~eit 
diese)t:' Offen"6ai:iin~ ~a~ erste unCi das letzte , daB , \'1orueber kelona 
~'iahi"hElit hinausge en kqennte , depa,gegenueber alle FEa~e nach del' 
r~oe~lichkeit , nach empiriscner faktizitaet und nae , Wid0r spruech-
lie kei~ aufhoarts . Die Offenbarung staende !!!! !!1la~·al1er 
unsarsI' v/ahrheit . Diese tvahrheit haette sieh nach i , nieht die 
5f'fenbarung nad,.i. p.nsere~ vor~ehende!!1;JCiihr~swrssen zu richt"en. tr 
Jaspe.r s , VQP. del'" iPlaIirhe;z.t ., ~ 2. 
6 tfDas r~wnschenwort ist nicht mehr Gottes Wort fI 
Jaspers , Del'" rnrlosophische (a~e , ' 56" - - ' • 
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the form of .finit~ truth , which is the proper characteristic of 
every human truth , Revelation is for this world , therefore it 
receives all the limitations of the \vorld* "The truth of man is 
subject to logic and human experience. n7 
Revelation for Jaspers is an absurdity , for it preaches 
that \1hich is impossible in itself. for example , the dogma of 
Incarnation . nIt is an absurdity that God could become man or 
man become God " u8 All the proofs concerning the Re .surrection of 
Christ are false, because they try to prove what i s impossible in 
the world . We cannot rely here upon witnesses , because we know 
from experience about witnesses \-.rho ,\1ere subjectively sincere, 
but \...rho witnessed pure illusions. 
Having rejected the proofs of witnesses, Jaspers comes 
to the criticism of the content of Revelation . He re.jeets 
Christianity for mor al reasons . A logical absurdity for him does 
not mean an ultimate condemnation , s i nce "absurdi ty is the form 
of r evelation of Transcendence through reasoning .. n9 Instead of 
rejecting categorically a.bsurdity as such , Jaspers distinguishes 
between a "r evealing absurdity" (das offenbarende Absurde) and a 
"misguiding absurdityU (das !!l die I1"1"e f\lebrende Absurde) ~ \ at 
does this distinction mean? Jaspers ' God is a hidden God . There 
7 Jaspers ; Von del" 1JJahrhe:i.t , 852. 
8 Ibid . 
-
9 Ibid • . 8 • 
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fore from the human standpoint it would be absurd that God could 
come into contact with man . But such a contact could be possible 
from the standpoint of' God , although it would remain an absurdity 
for man , yet a ltrevealing absurdity, n since God in this case vloule 
reveal Himself to us and thereby enrich our knowledge by grant-
ing us some i nsight into His Olm nature . But de facto the Bibli-
cal Revelation is not n'the word of God" and hence it is a ttmis-
gui ding absurdity," namely , in so far as it is based on the 
erroneous supposition that God has spoken to man . So for a phi-
losopher "the myth of God-f.1an is a misguiding absurdity , nl0 for 
the r eason that nit does not lead us through the Agape of love to 
Transcendence , but rather ·enfetters us 'Vlith empty dogmas . "11 
Jaspers also makes severe objections to the personality 
of Jesus , not only as MeSSiah, but also as man . He o1jects that 
Jesus was a H\l}'orld-shy" personali ty, that He \~as rather ·'an ex-
ception, but not c omplete man , n becau,se He lacked "active sense 
f or the world and knovdedge . n121'o follo"1 Christ means for 
Jaspers tlto want a life which leads to self ... destruction. 013 A 
perfect realization of Christianity l"l<)uld destroy man t slife . 
Ther ef'ore Christianity is in fact a compromise with t,he require-
10 Ibid .. 
-
11 I bid . 
12 Ibid ., 854 . 
11 Ibi d RI) t} . 
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menta of life.. Yet Christians, Jaspers objec'ts , a lthoughJ on the 
one hand, they cannot themselves tallow the teaching of the 
Gospel , by their pretension to exclusive truth are ugly fanatic.s , 
on the other ,,14 
Having rejected Revelat.ioI1 as a. ttmisguidlng absurdity, n 
Ja.spers turns his criticism tOl!Tards every form of religion . Firs 
of all , he attacks dogma ,. designating it as "myth" (~lytl'lUS) . 
Believing in dogma i s characterized as ttbeliaf against reason, 
not beyond rea50n. n15 To accept dogma means the same as to 
"sacrifice the intellect .ft Religious cult , too, is rejected by 
Jaspers , because it &"Upposes a personal God ;. A personal God is 
nothing else but anthropomorphism, where absolutized man is made 
God .. Therefore Divine PrOVidence is only a ffsublimed magic. n 
It is an illusion to believe that God cares about us and requires 
prayers from us, since U'real 'franscendenee does not ask from us 
either cult, or propa,ganda . n16 Prayer , as assurance of divine 
help, hinders one from the search for God instead of encouraging 
him . The Chm .... ch, Jaspers f inally says, is a h,.uman institution, 
14 Jaspers , Dar Philos~ph~pc~e Glaube , 69-72; see also 
Jaspers , Von der WahrneI"t, 85' . . 
15 . !tGeg~R. den Ve::stalf!41. nic!l.'1? uebe~ Qfdl !erst?-,ng, hin-
Jaspers. . J.+osopme, ~oz .. 
16 Jaspers , Philosophi~, 783 , 
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since "the 't'lord of man is not t he vlOrd of God . tt17 It is rather 
an expression of :fI'Jacht\'lil1e ( lIthirst for .po\<lJer U ) of priests , who 
promise salvation for their subjects in return for their blind 
obedience . Theref ore the philosopher must fight against the 
Church , since otherv/ise blind obedience "wuld mean treason of 
freedom wp.ich is the most valuable . ,1ft God can give to man . 
li'or this reason Jaspers urges the philosopher to choose betv'J'een 
the two alternatives! religion or reason.1 g J.II.fan cannot sellout 
his freedom and his reason in f'avor of authority. The fight 
against the ffidolization of God" i s a necessity f or 1nan ~ This 
crusade is the inevitably necessary task of the philosopher , if 
he t'lants ttto preserve his freedom t .hrough ind! vidual risk ", ,,19 
Following Jaspers t reasoning ,.,e notice his peculiar 
inclination of' speaking in paradoxical t er ms: in the knovvledge 
of being 'V'Ie think of it in terms of objects a.nd yet these objects 
do not give us any knol'J'ledge of being as such ; in the cognition 
of God f s existence we come to knoV'f God through symbols or ciphers 
and yet t he knowledge of ciphers cannot be r egarded as knowledge 
at all . I t seems that paradox is a necessru."'y element in Ja.spers t 
philosophy . Indeed, after havi urged man to fight against 
17 See above, p . 57 . 
1$ flDie Wahl zwischen Katholizitaet unq Vernunft . tJ , 
Jaspers , Von der traErheit , 857 .. . 
19 Jaspers , Philosophie , 257 . 
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every .form of religion, he unexpectedly declares: TtRe ligion is 
not an enelny of philosophy . 11 20 Is this a contradict ion or a. re ... 
vocation of his prev.ious statements? Not at all . His criticism 
of religion, as he says, is directed only towards a certain .form 
of religion, namely , religion in so .far as it becolnes rigid in 
its "misleading objectivity. n "Philosophy .fights against reli-
gion, yet alt·,a.ys against a certa.in religion in its untruth . ,,21 
Religion for Jaspers is ttuntrue 'tr in so far as it is ftobjective tl ; 
it is fl obj'ective" in so far as it is expressed by a certain dogma 
cult and Church . For this reason religion must be r ejected . 
But the very source of all religions , from t'lhich all confess i ons 
originate, forces our philosopher to change this hostile atti tude 
towards religion into an attitude of respect . Vie must respect 
religion as a possible truth, although a truth of others, i , e . t 
we must respect religion .e.§. truth, although it is ~ till truth 
(die Wahrheit nicht fuer .m!.£h) .. UTtere is truth in religious 
existent even if it be not appropriat.ed by me . 022 In other h!orcis 
we fight against objectively expressed religion (because it is 
t1falsii'icationft in the sense that ttthe word of man is not the 
word of God") , but , on the other hand , ~ must respect religious 
conviction .!§. such , since such conviction is truth f2.;: !l.!§.!! as 
20 Jaspers . Del" Philosol:?hi.sehe Glaube, 61. 
21 Ja.spers , Philosophie). 256-2 57 . 
22 Ibid . 257 . 
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Ureligious existen~ . n 
trhis negative and destructive criticism of religion by 
Jaspers is followed by his s.omewhat positive approa.ch to religion 
when he says that ttthe contents of the supposed Revelation (die 
Inhalte behaupteter Offenbarung) , cleansed from their character-
istics of absoluteness and exclusiveness , can be substantially 
assimilated philosophically as eiphers . n2,3 Al though Christ was 
no God, yet we can regard the f'myth of Christ" as a ful ly author-
ized cipher which can mediate between God and man . 24 Also person-
al prayer approximates to philosophical contemplation , and even 
merges in it , when it is cleansed from its utilitarian character-
istics . Yet , s ince prayer is to be considered as man's relation 
with a p;ers~::ma! God , i t is radically different from philosophical 
contemplation , and therefore transition from prayer to contempla-
tion is like transition from the order of religion to the philo-
sophica.l order . Although considered from a philosophical stand-
point prayer is better tha.n lithe complete lack of rfranscendence , tt 
yet philosopher as such can never submit himself to the practice 
of prayer without spoiling his personality . HHe , too, '-muld 
like t o fallon hi s knees , but he ca.nnot do it before that ""hich 
is only a human product U (i . e .. , God , in so far as He is made an 
23 Jaspers , Von Star V{ahrheit , 1052 _ 
24 Ibid , 
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object of adoration) " 25 Yet our philosopher gives up prayer "uth 
a certain feeling of pity in his heart: "Prayer is a possible 
realit y , lacking t.micp. I experi ence grief r ather than tt'iumph •. tt26 
The same sense of hardship Jaspers experiences , when he finds 
himself as a philosopher compelled to remain outSide of the 
Chureh ll, He admits t he tremendous role of the Church in creating 
and preserving culture , and the unquestionable richness of its 
tradition; but he cannot accept it, since it is only a puman 
institution . 27 Ther efor e he f i nds himself f orced to fight agai nst 
its pr etension t o exclusiveness (AusschJ.iesslichkeitsansprueh) . 
"Every confession is good , 1I since "every pious community gathers 
its members :from all confessiotls . n2$ hut one cannot remain in 
the Church , \"1here the philosopher i s excommunicated by the theo-
logian. The best thing , says Jas pers , is to r emain all"1a.ys a 
ffprotestant" in so far a s the Church i s concerned: "I dare to 
remain i n the Church as a heretiC , or , in other \'lords , protestant 
par !3xceJ,lep.ce . n29 
Jasper s t expression that one might remain i n the Church 
25 Ibid . , 259 " 
26 lbi p •• 267 ., 
27 Jas per s , Del" Philosophische yl aube , 65 . 
2$ Ibid ., $7 . 
29 Jaspers , Philosophie, 267 . 
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'" 
as a ttprotestanttt does not mean that one could belong to religion 
and at the same time be a philosopher . Contrari'l,..rise , even admit -
ting the insuff.iciency of philosophy in solving religious problems 
one is not supposed to turn himself to religion for ans\l[ers , 
because "the hidden T:ranscendence forbids t he philosophe'r to re ... 
turn t o r eligion. u30 One cannot usaeri.fice his i ntellect U and 
betray his freedom. Therefore Jaspers requests n~m to ma.ke ell 
deci sion, either for phi .l osophy or tor relig ion. , uThi s decision 
is such that no honest man can avoid it J. i f he does not want to 
remain in the dar kne$s of indecision",,31 But decision fot' philo-
s ophy cannot become denial of !_eli.gion !!. such, Jaspers ,\;'laTns .. 
It \¥ould be perniCious to philosophy, because ffphilosophi .cal 
eontent sexist in masses alao i n the form of religious belief .• ,,32 
Therefore the t ension existing between philosophy and r eligion 
should be understood as a readiness of philos ophy to lend at help-
ing hand to rel i gion ra.ther than ~s a denial of religion . ttTend-
eney to aid religion is a prete:nsionofevery philosophy. n33 
This aid of philosophy to religlon consists pr incipally 
1.11 the efforts of philosophy t o influence religi oll i n the sense 
30 I~Jc\,,, . 259 .. 
31 Ibid., 258. 
32 Jaspers , D¢.1f. PhiJosophi sehe GJ,aub~, $5 .. 
33 Ibid _ t ($9 " 
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that the latter should give up its pretension to the exclusive-
ness of truth . Religion should give up its standpoint that its 
t ruth "binds everybodytt (allgemeingy.eltige Wahrheit) , since 
"pretension to exclusiveness is only a human prpduct , but not 
founded in God. Who left many ways leading to Hi m. tt34 This pre-
tension to exclusive truth is unjust as well a.s perni cious for 
us _ It i s the source of all fanaticism . It doep not belong to 
the essence of any confession that any of' them "TOuld be consider-
ed as the only t rue one and binding everybody. Biblical reli-
gions, especially Christianity, have submitted themselves to the 
temptation of exclusiveness . And since this will of exclusive-
ness is mostly rooted j.n the ftGod ... :b1a.n myth , ft Jaspers says , 3 5 U"l€ 
must abandon the religion of Chr1b"t which regards Jesus as God . ff 
Thi.s t elig ion is true in the sense t hat God sEeaks ~ !!'!!!l ~hrough 
!lli!!! ,. But God never speaks exclusively through only ~ man . 
Ghrist is not God , but man , the last of biblical pr ophets, 
through whom God has spoken . Therefore Jaspers ,~ould "demythize ft 
(entmI!!hl,sieren ) religion! tf pemythizing here cannot stop del i -
beratel y ., Also the most thoughtful myth i s only myth ,.,,36 True 
religion is possib~e only \vhen it is cleansed from myths l-/hich 
34 Ibid ~, 75 . 
35 Ibiq •• 80 . 
36 Ibi .. d •• £31 . 
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coneeal from .our eyes its essence . What then does this fltruett 
religi on consist in? Jaspers does not hesitate to present us 
\vi th a general outline Qf. the "true n religion: 
PhilosQPhi cal belief considers the following mQments Qf the 
biblical religion as essential and true~ 
Acknowledgment of the one GQd !l! 
}vian is absolute in his decision bet\lreen good and evil . 
Love is an expression and realiza.tion of man's desire to Ii va 
for ever . 
Man's internal and external activity is his prQbaticn . 
The leading i deas of the world are historically absolute ,. but 
they cease to, be absDlute Dr exclusive when they are expres-
sed " 
World is created and contingent; it is inccnsistent in itself 
it is lacking a perfect harmony and crder. because .of the 
limitations and imperfections involved. 
V.Je are subject to the experience .of limit-situations . 
God is our ultimate and cnly refuge .3? 
This sort cf rel i gion "'rhieh Jaspers propcses to us is 
more like a phil osophica.l doctrine than r eal religion . l is at-
37 . flMomente d;ieser Ylabfheit , UQch etomal ausgesprochen, ill E,tlilo.soph,ischer Glauoo 1 sind: ' - . ~ der {1edanke dese!nen uctt es , 
,gas ~wussts~ del" U;t'6edi~:the;it ~ Eni? s.ch~JduEt~ zld.sche~ 
Gut und Boese !.!!! endb.chen .~nschen ; 
.~. i~ T~t - hi.,nne..re.n und: aey.sseren .!!§l.lldelns ... ~l§ Bewae~rung 
·es l'vlepse . en t • 
aie tJ.tdnUpgSldeen de)." l.'lelt a I ,S ~war J9weil§ gesq,ht.chtlic,h 
unbed,l.ngte , abel" ohne Ibsotuthel.t und Alleipgy.eltl.gke1t ihrer 
~rscfieiqunf · - - . - . 
die U¥!9sc71ossenheit clair' gesohaffenen i'?elt , ihr Unbestand 
a'Us ~l.ch , das V'ersagen alle!' Ordnungen !!! (frenzen, lli lk .. 
fihrung des Aeussersten , 
4.i~ letzt~ Hnd einf(iige Zuflucht P~J. Gott .• tf , 
Jaspers , Der PhilosoEhische Glaub.~, $2. 
tempts to ureforra tt religion in their ultimate results lea.d to a 
complete denia.l of a posi t i va r eligion, since by ncleansi.:ngfr r e -
ligion fr om "myths" Jaspers practically takes a"'lay its very 
essence . 
In this connection it must be remarked , hO\'1 superf icial 
is the opinion of those '\1ho classify Heidegger and Sartre a s 
chief r epresentatives of atheistic existentialism, and regard 
Jaspers and r·w.rcel as Chris·tian thinkers . If Gabriel reel 
really merits the name of Christian existentialist, the same 
term ca.nnot be ascribed to Jaspers . 3$ 
There must be acknowledged one positive characteristic 
in Jaspers' philosophy, namely , his logical consistency (in spite 
of the fact that "logic" is the object .of his m.ost serious cri-
tiCi sm) : if being as $uch cannot be known , t hen God must remain 
{thidden, n but where a personal God is denied in a philosophy, 
there is no place left fOl" <it positive religion in such philosophy .. 
Butts the price not too hi gh: to sacr ifice fundamental tz"Uths 
f or the sak e 0.£ logical demands? 
• t 
38 The author at t he beginning of this work has purpose-
ly charact·erized Jasp.ers as a nt heistic existentialist U (see above 
p . 9 ), . but in clzassifY.ing the existentialists into atheistic and 




The author does not consider this presentation of 
Jaspers t phi.losophical thought as being a complete picture of." his 
system. This "t'las not his original intention . He has confined 
himsel f only to the problems directly or :i.ndirectly related to 
the teaching of Jaspers concerning God ' s existence . But no phi -
losophical consideration should be missing a critical evaluation 
of the method and solution of the original problem. 'l'herafor e 
the author will devote t his chapt er to a criticism of problems 
discussed in the previous chapters . He considered it appropriate 
to postpone the criticism to the end of the "lOrk rather t han 
criticise Jaspers f philosophy portionally , since in the case of 
Ja.spers t he particular problems remain quite obscure unless they 
are subsumed under a somewhat gener al pi.cture of his phi l osophy 
as a. \'lhole . For exa.mple, the full meaning of his distinction 
between objects of empirical rea lity and being as such becomes 
clearer only when he discusses the problem of God t s existence and 
considers these objects as relative ciphers of the Absolute Being . 
So in the first part of thi.s chapt er it will be pointed 
out that Jaspers ! moral interpr etat ion of knowledge gives us an 
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explanation of his position regarding the existence of God; in 
the second part the advantages. and deficiencies of Jaspers' phi -
losophy '\-till be considered " 
A. Ja.spsrs ' philesophy ,u. metaEfursics ba·sed 2!1 moralitx _ 
Jaspers has not found God by ra.tional investigation. Rational 
cognition fer hiro is only one 'part of knowledge which must be 
tfsupp1ementedU by the whole human being, or , i .no'ther words , 
completeknolflledge is that '''hieh is realiaed in life . No 1'hi10-
sophy f or hi m is complete in its logical expression_ It must be 
" supplemented" by the ~x1stent, as it has been previously 
. . 
UsupplementedU by that philosopher , who . once through it , ha.s 
slepT·as.sed hirose·lf in the sense that he lived according to that 
which he taught .. For example , ! a$ a reader must be ftsupplement-
edtt by living out the philosophy l>lhichis presented to Iile in 
Jaspers' teaching . 
Also God can be approached only by the e::dste~~ " which 
means that our k.no,"lle,o,ge {}lone cannot lead liS to God unless it is 
supplecmented by l'1existenceft of the knowing subject . Therefore 
instead of' llil.l..a1lX kno'td:g.s God Jaspers rema.ins in a cp-ntinuouf! 
eearch for Him., The aim of existential knmil'ledge is not knot-F-
ledge, but appeal . ftThe truth of existential knowledge consists 
not in the content as such, but in "" hat is going on in me during 
the moment of knowing . 111 And what is going on in me during the 
1 Jas ers Von 
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process of knO\nng is nothing else but the awakening .Qf nwse1 f !.! 
lliI'$el,f . 2 This existentia.l "a'\'lakening of myself" is the very 
ma~sure at: ~ t1l1.lthenticitI of philosophieal knowledge . Itruly 
and in so far philosophically knoYJ', if and in so far as I trans-
form ;nys~lf ~ !!l ~xistent . Therefore existential kno,,,ledge is 
either authentie , and then it is inseparably connected irlth the 
kno'l;;ring subject , or j.t is unauthentic, namely, as a content of 
somebody other than myself, ' Th1s interpretation of knowledge 
confers a moral ehar'acter on Jaspers t< \<,Thole philosophizing , since 
morality essentially consists in appeal . As long as moral prin-
ciples are merely known and not carried out ill life , they remain 
useless (although they do not lose their meaning e11€lfi in this 
case)" In the logical order the 'frtay of knowledge is the only ... ;ay 
to truth, but the tl"'Uth of the moral order is essentially the 
truth of life . In other "vords , as long a s I do not live accord-
ing to the moral principles, I am al"''1ays morally \In.jus~ .. Knm., ... 
ledge alone here is not suf ficient . In this sense moral knO't'lledge 
is only and in so far true , when and in so far as it :ts realized 
in life . This is the clue for the better understanding of 
Jaspers ' r>hilosophy . What in logical sense seem to be inconeei ve-
able paradoxes, in the moral order turn out to be serious truths . 
2 Jaspers, Phi,losophie , 3. 
3 Ibid _. 676 ; see also Jaspers . Del" rhilosophische 
Glaube , 123 _ 
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Vlhen Jaspers demands that we relativize every truth and advises 
us to remain in the '{flay of continuous search for it , it means in 
the logical sense an illicit elevation of the search as such in-
t o the rank of truth itself . But this is true in the moral order 
because of t he fact that moral perfection cannot be obtained 
once for the \mole life ;w lVioral goodness must be strived for as 
long as ''ITO live ,. says Jasp.ers ; 4, and there he is right . 
This mor a l approach to Jaspers' philosophy enables us to 
grasp t he true meaning of his statement, that existential truth 
is absolute not because of its universality , but because of its 
historicity . ' Jaspersian truth is not a truth of knmdedge , but 
it is a truth of life ,. a truth of concrete acti.vity . But life is 
always "historical, n s ince its place is ttin time,n and. it cal'mot 
elevate itself to the state of atemporality, to eliminate i tself 
from ntime n as knowledge does . In this sense it ,\.,ould be unjust 
to speak of' !tun! versal act! vitylt in the same sense in w'hi ch \'le 
speak of' t he universality of knoltJ'ledge. But we cannot affirm 
either that universality , in the sense of absolute validity, is 
a property of knowledge onlJ!: , and that activity must allflays 
remain relative . Our activity, too , must somehow be made abso-
lute. It is elevated to the rank of absoluteness in so far as 
4 t'If I \'lould stop search1;ng , I would cease to exist It tt 
Jaspers , Phi losophie , 676 ; see also Jaspers , Von del' VIahrheit , 
222 . 
5 See above , p . 23 . 
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it is based on stempo:ral values !! Thus , although moral a ctivity 
takes place in timet yet there inheres in it an et ernal value 
"d'hich obliges us $0 absolutely that \.;e can fae ·e death itself. 
Moral value.s !!! such are, absolut e , ; yet moral activity is a most 
personal activity. While ,in other activities I can be replaced 
by somebody else, my moral perfection is my most personal obl:l.ga-
tion . In this sense morality is a field ~lhere absoluteness yO-
incides with personality .• 
In the same moral sense we have to understand Jaspers t 
teaching that Uexistential truth is that 1tlhich binds us t f and that 
"it has its source in commllnication. n6 It means that the object-
iva cri terionof truth must be replaced by a oornmup.icati va cri te-
rion . HEA"istential knot'l}'ledge requi:r:'es a s pecific criterion of 
truth , which cannot be objective ••• a philosophical idea is true 
in so far as it stirs up cornmunication . n7 Thi~ statement again 
i s based on a moral interpretation of truth . It is true that 
moral activity is not subordinated to an objective criterion in 
the same sense as , f'o~ example ., our social ; economical or tech-
nical activity is subordi'nated to the ends and goal s \-lhieh are to 
be attained 4! This latter activity is judged according to its 








conscience.. Our moral aets recai Vfl their value not because of 
ob.jectJ.ve r0sults~ but because of the faithfulness t ,o conscience . 
Althou,gh the phllosophyof e:).'is't;;cnoe has a moral eba .... 
raoter yet, it is not just a sort 01' moral philosoph" or ethics. 
Here rathr i s ,aqueation of a ne,"! t'e-eva untion ot the r-elat_ons 
exi8tint! betlrtleen ethics and metaphysies t/ vIhile tradit10na ethics 
takes its principl'es £'ro'm mett!phyaj.es . the philosophy of existence 
bases m~ta.phys:tes aneth es... Philosophical spaeulaticm haa btl!en 
accusedo£ .::ts str~eneos to 11£e ~ and aspers. following t.he 
slogan of .~bensph~!os,02h1e. tries to introduce a upbilos'ophy of 
life , 11' or . a.t least, one close to life. F.th1.cs becomes th . ource 
of th~.s ph11oaoph.y f since it points to activity and not to ab ... 
straet knmtledge lO The eld.st.antial 'subject. of knoilrledgo is not 
logical, but moral personality.. It 1oe1cal subject of' eonscioue-
n$SS in general is l1mitedonly to tbe knowledge of ~mp1r1eal 
reality. The problem of Absoute !mint; aris~$only for an E];gt3~ ... 
~,n.t. 0.;..'110 10 n moral p .rsonality. It the vlay to God is .an eth cal 
\tay t t.hen tho truth of God has l'llor .• J and not logioal ee:1"ta!nty .. 
Thltt certainty or God j,s the certaint.y of moral conviction and not 
. he certainty oJ: loe1cal ko 'ledge: tl'l"he reality of' Being is the 
real! ty of' conscience" ,,8 
Th:i.s Ittol"al interpretatl.on o f. J8SPOl"-e r~nrea.l$ to us t he 
a 
.... r~ .....,;;;;,d=s~n,... . ... s . ft J 
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very structure of the philosophy of existence . Jaspers preaches 
the impossibility of knowing being in a logical w·ay , and the 
"empty space" left by logical knowledge is to be filled in by 
I'texistence , n By this he confers on his doctrine of unknowability 
of truth t he character of moral demand . When he logically 
Uestablishesn the fact that Absolute Being II unkno".,able, he at 
the .sa.me time morally demands that Absolute Being !!I!!.§1 remain 
Ul'j{uowal:>le... According to Jaspers, since being in itself , because 
of its alogical character , cannot be knovm in a logical way , 
Abso.lute Being also must be sea.rched for in an alogical way , na.-
mely, through existential freedom .. This logical unknol'rabil" tyof 
being is the very condition of our freedom . 9 Therefore logos 
I01..lst fa.ll in order to save ethos: God must remain hidden in 
order that our .freedom be saved . If' Transcendence had r eveal ed 
itself to us , we would have cea.sed to be "existentsU since ou.r 
f'reedom l-Tould be destroyed . God wants us to be free, thercfOTe 
He remains hidden . 
Although Transcendence must rernaJ.n hidden i n order that 
we as existents be saved, yet there would be !!2 existent wi thout 
Transcende nce. Transcendence is that Hin which and th.rough which 
we are we-ourselves and free "ulO The human being is a.n existent 
9 See above " p . 21 ff' . 
10 Jaspers , Von der Wahrheit. 107 . 
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in. so far as he is Cl\t'lare of his freedom; he is free in 80 f ar as 
he is conscious t hat he "has been given to hi mse l f by Transcend ... 
ence "nll In other worda, it is necessary that God exist, yet He 
lntlst remain hidden in order' that \'le .. as existents , would be s aved 
fro.m destruction. 
As 'IIle have seen, Jaspers ' philosophy of existence, in 
spite of' its ethical character " is something more than a simple 
theory of ethics . Insta'ad of developing moral conclusions of a 
given metaphys.ics , he dictates metaphysics itself in the name of 
morality. 
B. "lay 9t: truth . or .e. bY-'ll/a!? t'le cannot raise the question 
in the case of Jaspers, as we could raise in the case of Sartre , 
raetzsehe or Heidegger: is his philosophy atheistic , or is it 
not ? As we have seen, t he whole pbilosophy of Jaspers is full of 
longing to find God . v.!hy then do all his efforts to find the 
Absolute r esult in his fat a l admission t hat Hfailure is the last 
12 
word?" We can anSl'1er t hat it happens because Jaspers devalu-
ates our reason ( a characteristic .feature common to all exist-
ential ists) . EY..istentialists , according to Jacques IJftSritain, 13 
have "thrown out reason, tl by confining it to the kno\,lledge of 
11 See above, p . 53 . 
1 2 " Pas Scheiter:n 1st das Letzte ,. n t Jaspers , Phi 10 sopl1i, IJ 
13 Jacques J'ilaritain F.xistence and E:x:ist~mt , tr . by 
Galantiere - Phelan . Pantheon. 1948" bO . 
I 
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empirical reality only . Jaspers t proposed .... vay to search for Ab-
solute Being through philosophical belief is ~ priori marked vdth 
uncertt;inty, sj.nce . according to his m>lIl \fIOrds. thi s \'I}'ay is the 
",-yay of i gnorance .. 14 But r emaining ignorant one \<Jil1 never come 
to a kno\'dedge of anyt~ling, just as a blind man 'lfnil never be 
able to see light as l ong as he remains .blind. Therefore it is 
no t-.ronder that Jasper s ' "momentat'y break-through 01' hope and 
confident affirmation of reality of the Ground of being , U as 
Fathe.r Klenk remarks , 15 flsoon sinks in an icy eold po.ssibility 
that t his is only .delusion . lt If fta small mistake in the begin-
ning is a great one in the end , " as St . Thomas16 says paraphrasi 
Aristotle , than is it no wonder that a system built on question-
able foundations must sooner or later collaps~? 
Jaspers has founded his philosoph~of existence on the 
Kantian hypothesi s, according to ,,{hleh phenomen.on can in no way 
manifest noumenon; that phenomenon presents only an empty object-
ivity and not the thi ng as it i s in itself. This doctrine "'lhich 
teaches that by kno\rdng a phenomenon or object we still cannot 
14 See above , p . 17. 
1.5 G. Friedrich Klenk, S . J •• "Del' .ferne Gott, " ~immeu 
del' Zeit, 145 , Her der, Freiburg , 1949-50 , 22$ ~ 
16 Thomas Aquinas , Saint , De Ente et Essentia, On Being 
and Essence , tr . lrith Introduction ana l\Yotesny A. :f.iaurer-;-
Toronto, Canada, 1949, 24 . 
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know the thing in itself is self- contradictory . If our knowledge 
were really res~icted only tp the appearances of things, then on 
what ground could we posit that there are ttappearances?tt Is it 
possible that there exist llappearance" If.rithout the thing lflhich it 
represents existing? 
'~oreover , Jaspers has confused i'inite being lrnt h bso-
lute Belngor God. " Be ing in ltselfr" (das Seln .!!! sich) , "being 
as suchu (daa Sein schlechthin) or uabsolute being" (absolutes 
Sein) t which he is speaking of, is nothing else but God . We at -
tribute the term f1absolute being" to God most properly, It means 
that God nis" absolutel¥" while created beings nare" only relati-
rely . God i! being, creatures only !l!!! haing., since being is 
the very essenee of God, as St. Thomas says:17 "It is impossible 
that in God Hi s being should differ from His essence." t 
Jaspers confuses finite being with Absolute Being in the sense 
that he speaks of them as if they were beings of the same order. 
Speaking of God he uses categories of sense experience only , for 
example, he r e j ects the principle of causality for the reason 
that it transgresses our experience: we do not find in reality 
any being which would be causa. sui iESiu,s. H~ Or, \"Then he tries 
17 Thomas Aquinas , Saint, Summa 1'heologica, I, 3 , 4; 
see also ibid.t I , 13, 11 . 
1$ Cf . Jaspers , Philosophie , 705-732 . 
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to de:fine God as nactuality without possibility, " he immediately 
r e jeets this concept on the basis tha.t there is nothing i n reality 
which would be actuality without possibility . 19 Therefor e it is 
a contradict ion ",,:hen Jaspers t r ies to define God by a categor y 
of empirical reality , such as the category of time . He says that 
we must think of God as existing in time, since exclusion of time 
would mean "only a concept without reality," and at the same time 
we must admit that God is "timeless. n since other \-nse He would 
not be eternal . 
Jaspers tries to convince us that t here is an intrinsic 
contradiction in every name we attribute to God, since "'119 cannot 
express God by any category without being compelled at the same 
time to express Him by a contrary ca.tegory, which l'lou1d destroy 
the former. For example , \'1e must character ize God as a unity of 
being and non-being . God is no det erminate being (nicht ain be-
stimmtes Et",,~a$ )) but such being is "the very being, n the most 
perfect being, since here is excluded every limitation and de-
termination. Thus, God is being and non-being at the same time , 
which is a contradictor y pOSSibility.20 1tle can answer that this 
is only a supposed contradiction . We call God a flnon- beingft in 
the sense that He excludes every limitation and i mperfection . 
19 Ibi d . 
20 See above , pp . 37-3 t:L. 
I 
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But this does not destroy the notion of being f since imperfection 
only shows that there is a lack of being. An imperfect t hing is 
lacking being i n so far as i t is i mperfect . Therefore ""'hen God 
"lacks" imperfections and limitations , i t means tha.t He is being 
in the most eminent way. 
Jaspers ' rejection of the principle of camsality is 
fatal to his whole theodicy. His cipher- theory loses all value 
by denying a minimum of kno\oTledge of what God is, since, accord .... 
ing to Jaspers, the ciphers signify that God exists, but they do 
not give us the least idea. of God's nature . This is a self-con-
tradictory proposition, since if we did not have ~ knowledge 
of what God is , then how CQuid we know that there is a similarity 
bet'tveen the symbol and the thing symbolized, i. e. t between 
ci phers and God? Jaspers' symbol-language speaks ambiguously of 
God. I t is an ftemptyfl language , as he himself admits: "symbol-
knowledge i s no knowledge. tt 21 We come to the knm'lledge of God 's 
existence based on the principle of causality. In our natural 
knowledge we start 'trl th things which are better known to us and 
go to things which are less known, as St. rrhomas says , 22 "begin-
ning with easier matters, we may advance more suttably in kn01Pl-
ledge . n Since effects ar e better known ~ us than their cause 
21 See above, p . 45 . 
22 'fhomas Aquina s , Saint, De Ente ~ Essentia, 2lh 
and since no effect can exist without a cause , according to the 
principle of causality , we go from things in the world to God as 
their cause . A mutual ca~sality of things themselves is not pos-
sible since an infinite series of finite causes cannot explain 
the creation of things. Therefore there must exist a causa sui 
ipsius , an uncreated cause, or ' God, Who is the efficient cause 
of all creation. 
Pa.raphrasing Jaspers that ue. demonstrated God is no 
God , n23 we can also admit that this is true in the sense that if 
our knowledge exhausted God , He would no longer be God o In a 
certain sense we a.lso admit a sort of "destruction" of our know-
ledge when we are dealing with God , i . e ., when we admit the im-
perfection of t his knowledge . Yet this destruction is not o£ 
such extent that \-/e could not know anything of the nature of 
God . St. Thomas teaches that w'e have some positive knowledge of 
what God is . Perhaps we are not capable of knowledge of the 
essence of God as such, yet we have an essential knowledge of 
the absolute attributes of God , although in an imperfect manner, 
namely, by means of an analogy of proportionality (ana-logia pro-
portionalitatis) . How do we come to this analogical knowledge 
of God? Our natural knowledge of God is based on the sensible 
23 See above , p . 40 . 
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character of our knowledge: we come to the knowledge of God by 
means of sensi ble reality ~ 24 Thus , all our natural kno'l,'l'ledge of 
God is causal and therefore it indicates that we can have neither 
univoca1., nor aequivocal knowledge of Hi m. Manser is right in 
remarking25 t hat we cannot know God univocally , since He is 
beyond all categories . A limited effect cannot exhaust i ts in-
finite cause . 26 Also aequivocatio, \~ich designates only a si-
milarity of names in absolute variety of things , cannot reveal to 
us the nature of God . 27 But we have an analogical knowledge of 
God , which st ands in the middle between univocat io and aeguivo-
cati o . All the proofs of God 's existence are based on analogy . 
But is there really possible a bridge betl'leen £!!§. !.E. a1:1.0 and 
ens !! se , betv'leen the finite and the i nfinite? I s there any pro-
portion existing between effect and i t s cause ? In other words , 
can 've knO\.., anything of the quidditat,ive nature of God? We canno 
knOirl by our natural knowledge, as St . Thomas says , 2g the essence 
of God as such , since no ~ partici patum can ever exhaust t he 
24 nNatura1is nostra cognitio !. sensu princi pium 
sumit . n, Thomas Aquinas , Saint , Summa Theologica , I t 12 , 12; see 
also ibid., ad 2: "Deu s naturali cognitlone cognoscitur per 
phantasmata effectus ~. n 
25 Gall us :r.l . Manser ., Das \'lesen des Thomi smus , Dritte 
Auf lage , Paulusverlag , Freiburg in aer Schweiz , 1949, 479 . 
26 Thomas Aquinas , Saint , Su.mma gontra Gentiles , I f 32 . 
27 Ibid ., I , 33 . 
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~ subsistens . But we can have some positive knowledge of the 
nature of God through His absolute attributes . St . Thomas de-
fines tnese attrib~tes as the attributes in the definition of 
29 which is not included any defect . By knowing these attributes 
of God we get some knowledge of the nature of God itse l f . How is 
that possi ble? There must be something quidditative common 
between creatures and God . Absolute attributes designate some-
thing "'Ihich in God really exists (in Deo ~ existunt ) .'3 Al-
though they db not exhaust the essence of God completel! (non 
totaliter totum) , yet these attributes represent to us the divine 
essence !tself (representantes divinam essentiam) . 3l The absolut~ 
attributes are to be ascribed to God substantia.lly (,substantia ... 
liter) and proper ly (proprie} ) 2 Hence although we can know 
through these attributes the divine nature essentially , yet our 
knowledge is imperfect . A perfect knowledge of something pre-
supposes the knmvledge of what a thing is (t£ quod est) and hm! 
it i s (~ecundum guo!! est ) . 33 il/e can arrive at some knowl edge of 
the quidditative nature of God , i . e ., we can have some knowledge 
of whai? God is, but we cannot know how He iS t because we cannot 
29 "lsb in guoru!!! definitione nOD: clauditur defectus . " , {;Juestiones disputatae de verit ate , 2, 11 . 
30 Thomas Aquinas , Saint ; Quest . disp . d~ potentia , 7,5 
31 Thomas Aquinas , Saint , Quest . disp . de veritate , 2, 1 
32 Thomas Aquinas , Saint , Summa 1'heologica, I , 13 , 2 . 
I 
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exhaust the divine essence 'ltlhich is !!!:!bstantiae pellagus in1'ini ... 
~.34 As finite beings we cannot exhaust the infinite bei ng of 
God , since we only have being, God is ipsum~. In so far as 
our natural knO'ltlledge of God is imper feet, it is negati va . But 
t his ' does not mean that our posit i ve knowledge of God is false . 
St . Thomas a'-rees ' with t he Pseudo- Dionysius that our negative 
knowl edge of God is more real than the positive . 35 For example , 
we know that God i s infinite , but we cannot grasp what His infi-
nity really means . In short, we can knO'\~ something of the qui d-
ditative nature of God , and in t hi s respect our knm'!ledge 1,S po-
sitive, but our knowledge is i mperfect , and in this sense it is 
negative. Hence our knowledge of God is not absolutely negative . 
Perfectiones simplices as such make possible an analogy 
between creatures and God . God is ens, verum, bonum; the crea-
tures also are ~, verum, bont\m . The se perfections ut sic 
express no modus essen(U ai t her of God .Q£ of creature . They only 
express the r:~lation existing between God and created t hings !> 
These per fections ar e for both intrinsi cally nece,ssary . This 
points to nothi ng else but to proportiona.li ty existing betYA'een 
the finite and t he infinite. Although there is no identity of 
33 1'homas Aquinas , Saint , Quest. di sp . de ver~t ., 2 , 11 . 
34 Thomas AqUinas, Saint, Summa '1'heologiea , I , 13, §ld 2 . 
35 Ibi d . 
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modus essendi between God and creatures , yet there is a similitude 
of relationship to these sin~le perfections . 
In this sense analogy of proporti onality is a bridge 
between ens finitum and 1mB infinitum. 0n the one hand , there is 
- ....-..... 
saved the immense distance between God and creature, but , on the 
other hand, the analogy of proportionality enables us to have 
some insight into the nature of God . Therefore instead of preach-
ing a complete destruction of our knowledge of God Jaspers rather 
should admit only imperfection of that knowledge . This destruct-
ion comes for him not for the reason that 'l>le would not kno'Vl1' that 
God exists, but only because we cannot have the least knowledge 
of His nature . There is denied the possibility of a contact 
between us and God because of the absolute infinity of the essence 
of God . But here again Jaspers is self-contradic,tory, since by 
this he indirectly proves at least one attribute of God, name ly, 
His inf:i.nity" 
Jasperst attempt to "demythize" religion must be cate-
gorically r e jected . . en he confers on philosophy the right to 
ffpur ify tt reli p.:ion,. it means that he brings relig~on to trial in 
the court of philosophy o This means nothing else but the secu-
larization of religion . We characterize this attempt of Jaspers 
as unjust , since to admit only that which can be grasped by reason 
and to reject everything that surpasses reason means to reject 
all religion as such. Divine reason cannot be brought to trial by 
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human reason . Although Jaspers says that he is fighting against 
tithe untruth of objectivized religion" only, and that he respects 
religion as such , but as "the truth of others," nevertheless in 
actual fact this does not change the matter, since actually every 
religion is flobjective!t in the sense that there is no r eligion 
without dogma , cult or Church . Theref ore by rejecting the "ob-
jective" form of r eligion Jaspers r e jects religion as such . His 
declarati on that he r espects religion as "truth of others ft does 
not change the matter : the question here is not about religion 
as such , but about religious conviction . We fight against a 
"strange truth" only when the qu'estion is not about di.fferent 
truths , but about truth and unt ruth . For example , there is no 
need that mathematics should right against biology, but chemistry 
. had t o fight agai nst alchemy , because the latter was proved as 
untrut h . Thus , it is impossible , that , fighting against religion 
as such , one could respect it as "the truth of others . " 
I t is impossible to grasp the essence of a religion for 
one who himself remains outside of it . Jaspers r emains outside 
of religi ous life confining himself to philosophy only . His 
philosophy itself excludes the possi bility of religion, since 
where a personal God is denied , religion is impossi ble . Also 
he could not grasp the essence of religion , because he denied 
the possibility of Revelation . By the fact of his denial of 
Revelation Jasper s does not distinguish between natural religions 
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and the revealed religion . Natural religions, since they are 
products of human reason , principally can be questioned by our 
intellect. For example , Greek philosophy really demythized Greek 
religion " But the relation of philosophy and religion is differ-
ent when ''f9 are confr onted with the Revealed Religion.. Here 
phi losophy is not competent to ' reject Revelat ion . Only a certain 
philosophy might reject Revelation but not philosophy ~ such . 
Philosophy as such , or human reason , does not exclude !! priori 
the possibility of Revelation since this possibilit;y is not self-
contr adictory . Rather philosophically considered it is possible 
to .admit t ha.t if t.here exist s a God (Jaspers admit s that) He can 
reveal Hi mself to us . The denial of Revelation is based usually 
on the absolutization of the human intellect . Here Jaspers is 
inconsistent: he would relativize every philosophical truth and 
at the same time he would absolutize philosophy to such a degree 
that t o its court he would bring reli l;ion itself. The absoluti-
zation of philosophy leads unfortunately to relativization of 
philosophical truthl By rejecting Hevelation because of t he abso-
lute unknowability of God aspers absolutizes the i mperfection 
and limitation of our reason. 
Jaspers calls all the truths and dogmas of Revelation 
tlabsurdities . It But 't~e can answer that they are not absurdities 
but deep truths and mysteries. Absurdity is that which is self-
contradictory and hence repugnant to our reason . But mysteries 
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surpass our reason and therefore cannot be grasped by it . Reve-
lation reveals to us facts not as contradictory to reason but as 
exceeding its limits . Hence our reason ha.s no right to question 
the validity of such truths , because they are beyond the reach of 
r eason . Just as every affirmation of reason is possible only t'lit 
in the limits of reason , so every negation" Beyond its limits 
reason Can neither affirm nor deny . 
Summarizing the thoughts expounded in this work the 
author comes t o the following conclusions: (1) One cannot accept 
Jasper s' philosophy in so far as it tries to base metaphysics on 
morality, since that i mplies the impossibility of our reason to 
come to the kno~lledge of Absolute Being , but one can agree "nth 
Jaspers that the searo h for and finding of God is the task not of 
rea.son only but it is the task of all the faculties of man . (2 ) 
One cannot accept Jasperst notion of truth, since by elevating to 
the r ank of truth every subjective conviction he degrades truth 
itself , but Jaspers rightly emphasizes the fact that truth must b 
realized in life , not only knoWD . (3) Jaspers' notion of God i s 
unacceptable ., since his immanent Transcendence is not a personal 
God, but his philosophy , which in solution of the problem of God' . 
existence is psychology of sea.rch rather than metaphysics i n the 
proper sense, allows us to understand better those who are seeki 
f or God in an invincible tension of faith and unbelief .• 
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